CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND FIFTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 22 April 1969, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mrs. A. MYRDAL (Sweden)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:	Mr. S.A. FRAZAO
	Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
	Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA
	Mr. J. NOGUEIRA FILHO
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. CHRISTOV
	Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
	Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV
Burma:	U KYAW MIN
Canada:	Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
	Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL
	Mr. J.R. MORDEN
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. T. LAHODA
	Mr. V. VAJNAR
	Mr. V. SAFAR
	Mr. J. STRUCKA
Ethiopia:	Mr. A. ZELLEKE
India:	Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
	Mr. N. KRISHNAN
	Mr. K.P. JAIN
Italy:	Mr. R. CARACCIOLO
	Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI
	Mr. R. BORSARELLI
	Mr. U. PESTALOZZA
Mexico:	Miss E. AGUIRRE
	Mr. H. CARDENAS RODRIGUEZ
Nigeria:	Alhaji SULE KOLO
	Mr. C.O. HOLLIST
	Mr. L.A. MALIKI

Poland:	Mr. H. JAROSZEK
	Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI
	Mr. H. STEPOSZ
	Mr. R. WIAZLO
Romania:	Mr. N. ECOBESCO
	Mr. V. CONSTANTINESCO
	Mr. V. TARZIORU
Sweden:	Mrs. A. MYRDAL
	Mr. A. EDELSTAM
	Mr. O. DAHLEN
	Mr. T. WULFF
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
	Mr. O.A. GRINEVSKY
	Mr. I.I. TCHEPROV
	Mr. N.S. KISHILOV
United Arab Republic:	Mr. H. KHALLAF
	Mr. O. SIRRY
	Mr. E.S. El REEDY
	Mr. Y. RIZK
United Kingdom:	Mr. I.F. PORTER
	Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY
	Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
	Mr. M.E. HOWELL
United States of America:	Mr. A.S. FISHER
	Mr. C. GLEYSTEEN
	Mr. W. GIVAN
	Mr. R.L. McCORMACK
Special Representative of the Secretary-General	Mr. D. PROTITCH
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): I declare open the 405th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

2. Before calling on the first speaker I have another duty to perform. You are all aware of the sad news of the death on 17 April of Mr. Emilo Arenales, President of the General Assembly and Foreign Minister of Guatemala. Mr. Arenales, who was stricken during the course of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly in New York last Autumn, carried on with great courage and outstanding competence despite the very serious operation he had undergone. Unfortunately, his malady was beyond the aid of medical science and Mr. Arenales' untimely death came when he was only 46 years of age.

3. I would ask the members of the Committee to rise and observe one minute's silence in tribute to the memory of Mr. Arenales.

The representatives, standing, observed one minute's silence.

4. The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): I am sure I am expressing the wish of all members of the Committee in asking Mr. Protitch to request the Secretary-General to convey to the family of Mr. Arenales our deep sense of loss and our sincere condolences.

5. I now call on the first speaker, the representative of Brazil.

6. Mr. FRAZAO (Brazil): "Hope", said Sir Francis Bacon, "is a good breakfast, but it is a poor supper". In this fantastic, sometimes promising but so often dreadful world we are living in, I wonder when we shall be entitled to our morning hopefulness again and not be haunted by the graphic images of the modern apocalypse.

7. The menace of destruction no longer comes under the disguises of old metaphors; it is compacted in so many abbreviations, in coupled initials, which spring almost every day out of the morning papers: IRBM, ICBM, ABM, FOBS, MIRV, ULMS, SABMIS, SS-9 -- and what next? Every morning they seem to take root in our lives and to cast a shadow over our existence, the shadow of the nuclear mushroom. What shall we see tomorrow, what other sentences of potential death and destruction shall we have as a substitute for our early morning expectations? And what for supper? Should we have for supper other abbreviations in different languages, which, because they are different, are still more impressive? Certainly if they were to be served to us at our late meal, evenings and nights would be nothing more than a tragic follow-through of what sometimes appear to be the hopeless mornings of the atomic age.

(Mr. Frazão, Brazil)

8. In our hands lies the tenuous promise of man's secular redemption in this last quarter of the twentieth century. Naturally we are not abstract sociologists, nor philosophers, nor academic political theorists, but primarily representatives of governments, spokesmen for national interests. We are bound by the limits of pragmatism, of political realities; we -- the members of this Committee -- are also serving several and sometimes conflicting doctrines. But in order to serve them better -- or may I correct myself and say: to serve them, period -- should it not be our first pragmatic, realistic endeavour to preserve from destruction the stage and the actors, that is, earth and mankind, so that the age-old game of national interests may go on? Thus, are we not entrusted with a responsibility towards the community of nations, and are we not supposed to find the point of equilibrium where national security and world security may stand together?

9. Disarmament, and especially nuclear disarmament, at the stage of potential total annihilation which unfortunately we have reached, means nothing more than that -- a decision, a common decision, to avoid that "le combat soit terminé, faute de combattants". That is why, at the outset of my first intervention in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, I dare express the deep conviction of my Government that this Committee faces a crucial moment. Shall we or shall we not respond to the summons of the United Nations? Can we or can we not give to the universal common man a new expectancy, a new hope, however dim, that he will not be destroyed by accident, by a strategic miscalculation or by unbridled warfare?

10. After more than seven years of continuous striving, with incipient results which barely alleviate a pervading sentiment of frustration, we might say that we have come to a crossroads. The first alternative is to embark on the set of decisions that are expected of us -- containment of the arms race and concrete measures of disarmament, primarily nuclear disarmament. The second alternative would be to let the arms race go on unchecked and by proceeding along this devious road to come soon, perhaps too soon, to a point of no return in the spiral of atomic escalation.

11. In spite of this crude appreciation of some negative aspects of current international life we still think that with a minimum of political good will we shall be able to reverse trends and open up brighter horizons for future generations.

(Mr. Frazão, Brazil)

12. The evolution of the international situation in the past few years has revealed, a persistent trend, despite occasional drawbacks, towards the establishment of certain areas of understanding between the super-Powers encompassing not only the solution of political and strategic questions but also the regulation of new fields of human activity opened up by recent major advances in science and technology. However, this improving climate has not been reflected in a positive way in the negotiations on disarmament. Quite the contrary: the nuclear Powers channel ever-increasing resources to the development and refinement of new weapons systems, thereby accelerating the arms race and jeopardizing international peace and security. Meanwhile the appeals embodied in several resolutions adopted by the General Assembly go unheeded. No resources have been freed through disarmament measures to be applied in the improvement of the economic and social conditions of developing countries, which is a fundamental challenge confronting the international community in our time.

13. Some of my colleagues who have already taken the floor have given us a rather optimistic view of the work performed in the field of disarmament. The representative of the United States, Ambassador Gerard Smith, mentioned the "limited but still highly significant successes" (ENDC/PV.397, para. 11) already achieved by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Others, such as the representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, and you, Madam Chairman, in your capacity as representative of Sweden, have depicted in sombre tones the present situation regarding arms control and arms escalation. I venture to say that there is truth in both views.

14. The mere fact that we are sitting around this table and debating such vital issues, which affect individual sovereign States as well as the world community as a whole, is already a reason for comfort and encouragement. In the history of international relations very few instances, if any, could be found of so many questions relevant to national and collective security being debated so earnestly. Questions that in the past lay within the province of a few States are today a matter of concern to the whole community of nations and fall under the jurisdiction of its institutional bodies. This is the reflection of the growing interdependence of nations.

(Mr. Frazao, Brazil)

15. Fully aware of this new reality we submit again that while basically representing the interests and views of our respective countries we also represent the common and fundamental interests of mankind. Because we are dealing with a subject that has a decisive bearing on the world community it is only natural for us to press for agreements that meet its legitimate expectations.

16. The ultimate goal of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, general and complete disarmament under effective international control, is a deep-rooted aspiration of mankind. Towards this objective less meaningful progress has been made.

17. Having in mind the broad framework of general and complete disarmament, it is imperative at this juncture that the attention of our Committee be focused on the negotiation of effective measures of nuclear disarmament. The concern of the international community over the meagre results so far achieved in this field finds eloquent expression both in the final document (A/7277) unanimously adopted by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and in the pertinent General Assembly resolution (2454 B (XXIII); ENDC/237) requesting the negotiation as a matter of priority of agreements on nuclear disarmament. At this stage therefore the emphasis should be on the adoption of measures for the cessation and subsequent reversal of the nuclear arms race.

18. The vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons in the last decade has developed so rapidly, sometimes even abruptly, that, in spite of the strenuous efforts made here, all progress accomplished in the same period becomes overshadowed, as if at every step forward we were to be confronted by a more distant and vanishing goal. Some achievements can be counted in the field of arms control, but unfortunately they have not yet proved sufficient to quiet our concern. Among those achievements, may I be permitted to refer to what is being accomplished by the Latin-American States. Positive and far-reaching action has been taken to abolish the possibilities of the existence of nuclear weapons in a large, populated area of the world without hindering in any way the full development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. This is for us a matter of pride and relief and we are persuaded of the desirability of establishing other nuclear-weapon-free zones provided that regional, political and security conditions are considered adequate by the parties concerned. The political will to arrive at such positive results demonstrated by Latin-American countries is the

(Mr. Frazao, Brazil)

essential element that should prevail also in the course of our discussions and should lead to a world liberated from suspicion, insecurity and fear.

19. There is no denying that as long as the nuclear arms race remains unchecked and nuclear capabilities of an overwhelming nature are available no significant progress can be claimed in arms control or disarmament negotiations. Unless this question of nuclear disarmament is properly stressed it will be impossible to achieve greater international security, to say nothing of approaching the goal of general and complete disarmament.

20. In the light of those considerations the Brazilian delegation will comment on some of the specific measures which are the object of our attention at the present session of the Committee and which would have the merit of at least progressively slowing down the nuclear arms race and contributing to bringing it to a halt.

21. The freezing of the production of fissionable materials for weapons use has been the subject of our deliberations practically since the establishment of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. To be accurate, it cannot be said that this cut-off will, by itself, lead to a substantial decrease in the destructive potential of nuclear arsenals, at least in the short term, in view of the hugh stocks of fissionable material held by nuclear-weapon Powers. But it may legitimately be called a step in the right direction since it would certainly curtail the possibilities of further deployment of nuclear weapons. Being a measure that does not have an erratic effect on the present strategic balance, the cut-off of fissionable material may be considered viable. Being a measure that effectively contributes to checking the nuclear arms race, it may be deemed desirable. This double characterization provides the basis for classifying this matter as an area where serious debate can be geared towards the achievement of concrete agreement, given the indispensable political will.

22. Important new developments have emerged in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament which open new prospects for progress. We think the situation is ripe and we are hopeful that the freezing of the production of fissionable material for military purposes will soon become a reality. In this connexion the Committee should bear in mind resolution J of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (A/7277), which requested the nuclear-weapon States to channel to a fund for the benefit of non-nuclear-weapon countries the special fissionable materials released as a result of the adoption of nuclear disarmament measures.

(Mr. Frazao, Brazil)

23. A second measure that deserves prompt consideration and action is the total banning of tests with nuclear weapons. Since the signing of the Moscow Treaty on a partial test ban (ENDC/100/Rev.1), there has been a wide range of appeals, recommendations and resolutions calling for the ultimate suspension of experimental nuclear weapons explosions, but so far no effective action has been taken in this field. The main purpose of a comprehensive test ban is perfectly clear -- to prevent further sophistication of nuclear weapons and thereby to put an effective halt to the present arms race. At this juncture, when new generations of offensive and defensive weapons are beginning to take shape, with the indispensable testing of new weapon explosives, it would be senseless to permit the continued waste of immense resources and to risk the possibility of an imbalance in the strategic equilibrium.

24. The Brazilian delegation has always supported the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in all environments and believes that nuclear devices should be used for only peaceful purposes, without any discrimination, bearing in mind the importance of such devices for the gigantic task of accelerating the progress of the developing countries. Our views on the matter are well known to members of this Committee.

25. As we have heard here, the intricate question of controls still appears today, as it has appeared for many years, to be the main difficulty in the path of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon underground tests. With almost these same words the Brazilian delegation, as long ago as 24 March 1964, in a statement made by Ambassador Araujo Castro (ENDC/PV.177, p.9), introduced a suggestion aimed at gradually banning such tests above decreasing thresholds. Available evidence indicates that recent advances in the field of seismological detection have contributed to offering new answers to this problem which in the very near future may lead to the adoption of generally acceptable formulae. The Brazilian delegation is keenly aware of the necessity of exploring all openings and of avoiding a premature handening of positions before alternative solutions are fully discussed and carefully pondered.

26. We welcome the initiative of the Swedish delegation in submitting a working paper (ENDC/242) which represents a serious effort to meet the recommendation of General Assembly resolution 2455 (XXIII) (ENDC/237). This proposal for the implementation of a most urgently required measure of nuclear disarmament certainly deserves our general appreciation, and should be pondered carefully by the nuclear Powers themselves.

(Mr. Frazao, Brazil)

27. I now turn to the question of the demilitarization of the sea-bed and ocean floor, in consonance with the already universally accepted principle of the peaceful uses of these zones. Thus we believe that the question of the limits of applicability of this prohibition should be disentangled from the more complex question of ascertaining the limits of national sovereignty or jurisdiction. A uniform set of criteria should be adopted which does not involve classifying a specific geographical zone as inside or outside national jurisdiction but ascertains solely whether it falls or does not fall within the boundaries prescribed for the purposes of a treaty on demilitarization.

28. Any other solution might delay unnecessarily an effective agreement to ban weapons from the bottom of the oceans and would overlap with negotiations which are under way in the United Nations Committee, set up for that purpose and which cover ground beyond the military field itself. In adopting such a solution one important and particular problem would be solved without establishing any precedent whatsoever for the definition of the limits of national jurisdiction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof.

29. Another relevant aspect of the problem is the scope of the prohibition. Regarding this aspect we favour, in principle, an agreement that would fully exclude the sea-bed and the ocean floor from the reach of the arms race. We think, however, that a ban on weapons of mass destruction could be a preliminary measure to be achieved immediately, and a step in the right direction, while full demilitarization is being considered in the light of underlying strategic assessments.

30. Finally, there is the question of the controlling mechanisms for that agreement. We believe that that question involves some difficult technical problems that deserve careful consideration. It might be that a purely reciprocal system of verification would create practical difficulties, for not all States would be in a position to exercise a thorough inspection of under-water installations. We would welcome further examination of all suggestions put forward with a view to formulating an effective and viable system of control.

31. We consider the draft treaty presented by the delegation of the Soviet Union and contained in document ENDC/240 to be an important and timely contribution to our deliberations in this Committee. We also heard with interest the views expressed on this matter by the delegation of the United States, as well as by other delegations that have commented on this problem.

(Mr. Frazao, Brazil)

32. Other questions -- such as the reduction of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and of offensive and defensive missiles -- should also be given adequate consideration although it seems that no relevant results can be expected before bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America get under way. It would, of course, be superflous to restate the great expectations that we place in those forthcoming talks.

33. Before concluding may I be allowed to make a few general and preliminary remarks on the question of the methods of work of the Committee. We are sensitive to some suggestions made here to expedite the conduct of our deliberations. The Brazilian delegation will approach with an open mind and in a constructive spirit specific proposals aimed at enabling the Eighteen-Nation Committee to discharge in a more effective manner the mandate entrusted to it.

34. We have accumulated in this Conference a considerable number of proposals, suggestions and ideas. Some of them depend upon our determination in order to be turned into effective measures of disarmament and arms control which can provide us with real security and not the "precarious security" referred to by the Brazilian Foreign Minister in his opening statement to the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, the security of peoples "contingent upon the existence of arsenals that daily increase in their sophistication". (A/PV.1677, provisional, p.6)

35. I hope in due course to speak in more detail on some of the specific items on our agenda.

36. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian) During the present session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament many of the delegations that have spoken have stressed the need to make further efforts aimed at reaching agreement on questions of general and complete disarmament. This has been mentioned by the representatives of Mexico, Sweden, Romania, Ethiopia, India and other States. At today's meeting the representative of Brazil has also touched upon questions of general and complete disarmament. A similar wish was also expressed by many countries at the twenty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly.

37. The Soviet delegation shares the concern of the representatives who have stressed the urgent nature of the problem of general and complete disarmament. The situation that has come about in the world urgently calls for the solution of that problem. The

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continuing arms race increases from year to year the risk of a world conflict, and the possible consequences of such a conflict, because of the accumulation of armaments, become each year ever more dangerous for humanity.

38. Speaking of the arms race, we cannot but note that it is a consequence of the military policies of some Western Powers. Influential circles in those countries are staking not on disarmament but on the arms race. The military bloc of the Western Powers, NATO, has become the most important factor in the arms race and in the constant aggravation of international tension.

39. The statement of the Soviet Government on this subject published on 10 April 1969 points out that:

> "The arms race imposed on the world by the North Atlantic Alliance is being spurred on by long-term programmes for the development of new and ever more costly and destructive types of weapons, which are being elaborated both jointly and individually by the members of NATO. That is one of the main reasons why vitally important questions of disarmament have not yet been solved."

40. The leading role played by NATO in the arms race is confirmed, in particular, by data concerning the military expenditures of the member countries of that bloc. According to information published in a report of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency those military expenditures are increasing much faster than the military expenditures of other countries of the world. During three years alone (1965-1967) they increased by 35 per cent. In 1966 the military expenditure of the NATO countries amounted to 53.9 per cent of the over-all world expenditure for military purposes. Thus the 14 countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with a population of about 500 million, are spending for military purposes more than all the other countries in the world, with a population of over 2,500 million. Since NATO has been in existence the States members of that organization have spent approximately $1,300,000 million. In the light of those figures it is impossible not to agree with the statements of those representatives who have emphasized, both at the twenty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly and at meetings of our Committee, the need to give a new impetus to negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

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41. The Soviet delegation shares that point of view. In the memorandum of the Government of the USSR on disarmament of 1 July 1968 it is stated that:

" ... the Soviet Government draws attention to the need for making every effort to achieve concrete results in solving the problem of general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Government deems it necessary to give a new impetus to the negotiations on this question in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament." (ENDC/227, p.5)

42. At the same time we cannot agree with the view expressed by some representatives that the discussion by the Committee of partial disarmament measures has pushed into the background the problem of general and complete disarmament. May I remind you that the discussion of partial disarmament measures in our Committee began in July 1965, after the Committee had attempted to find an over-all solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Union, which raised the problem of general and complete disarmament as long ago as 1922 at the Genoa Conference, has endeavoured to contribute in every way to an over-all solution of the problem. To that end, in 1962 it submitted for the consideration of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament a detailed draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Corr.1). This draft treaty provides for a broad programme of gradual disarmament, in three stages, covering the reduction and the subsequent elimination of armaments, the disbanding of all armed forces, the dismantling of foreign military bases on alien territory, the abolition of military conscription and other measures to ensure general and complete disarmament under strict international control.

43. However, at that time endeavours to find an over-all, comprehensive solution to the problem through stage-by-stage implementation of a disarmament programme met with the opposition of the United States and the United Kingdom. Under various pretexts the Western Powers either evaded discussing the substance of the disarmament problem or put forward proposals which were manifestly unacceptable to many countries. Thus, for example, a proposal was made to establish a system of control which would have been tantamount not to control over the implementation of the disarmament measures but to control over the levels of armaments and the state and fighting capacity of the armed forces of States.

44. In those circumstances it was decided to try another approach, namely, to attempt to reach agreement on those measures which were of the most urgent nature or on those

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in respect of which the points of view of the parties were closer. In putting forward the problem of accomplishing individual collateral disarmament measures, the Soviet Government based itself on the principle that they should eventually lead to general and complete disarmament. The memorandum of the Government of the USSR on measures for the further reduction of international tension and the limitation of the arms race, which was issued on 7 December 1964 (A/5827*), proposed a whole range of measures, many of which were similar to the provisions of the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament. In that memorandum it was stated in particular that the first steps in the field of disarmament, such as the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and the agreement not to place nuclear weapons in orbit.

> " ... should be followed by further agreements limiting the arms race more and more strictly, extending the area of international trust and thus clearing the way for the conclusion of an agreement on the fundamental question, namely, general and complete disarmament." (A/5827*, para. 2)

45. The fact that an organic link exists between partial disarmament measures and general and complete disarmament as the ultimate aim of our efforts is particularly illustrated by the following example. The Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control contained proposals to prohibit the placing in orbit or the stationing in outer space of special devices capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (article 14), and to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons (article 16). Those proposals have already become or are becoming norms of international law as embodied in article IV of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI) and in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/226*)).

46. We believe that the significance of partial disarmament measures is determined by the extent to which they contribute to curbing the arms race, to normalizing the international situation and to achieving our ultimate goal, which is general and complete disarmament. It is precisely on the basis of this premise that article VI has been inserted in the non-proliferation Treaty, which says:

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Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

Thus, consideration of and agreement on collateral disarmament measures can by no means hamper the continuation and intensification of our efforts to reach agreement on problems of general and complete disarmament; on the contrary, such measures are designed to lead us towards that goal.

47. In view of those considerations, the Soviet delegation deems that the time has come to give a more concrete shape to the negotiations on general and complete disarmament. That is required by the interests of maintaining and consolidating peace and is called for in General Assembly resolution 2454 B (XXIII) (ENDC/237).

48. The need to intensify efforts to achieve agreement on general and complete disarmament follows logically from the whole preceding course of the discussions on disarmament problems. Many representatives who have spoken here have noted quite pertinently that the cause of disarmament is entering a new and advanced stage. This stage is characterized above all by the fact that the slogan of disarmament which had long been regarded sceptically by some statesmen as a noble but unrealistic wish has now found expression in international agreements, and this opens up good prospects for the solution of other urgent problems of disarmament, including the main problem, that of general and complete disarmament.

49. In proposing that a new impetus be given to the negotiations on general and complete disarmament we are not faced with the need to start all over again, metaphorically speaking, from zero. We have a point of departure for such negotiations the aforementioned Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control. This draft treaty, worked out in full detail, is a good basis for fruitful discussions.

50. I should like to note also that as a result of the exchange of opinions in the period 1962 to 1964, we succeeded in reaching agreement in our Committee on the principles and order of consideration of disarmament problems. The joint statement by the Soviet Union and the United States on agreed principles for disarmament negotiations (ENDC/5) circulated as a Committee document in March 1962 clearly defined the aims of negotiations, the scope and content of the programme of general and complete disarmament, the principle of implementation of disarmament by stages and the criteria for transition from one stage to the next, the principle of balanced implementation of disarmament and the principle of the necessity of strict and effective international control.

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51. It is pertinent to note that from 1962 to 1964 certain work was also carried out which resulted in a number of agreed articles of a disarmament treaty. Working drafts of the preamble (ENDC/L.11/Rev.1), articles 1, 2 and 3 (ENDC/40/Rev.1) and article 4 (ENDC/55) of the treaty were elaborated. As the members of our Committee are aware, those working drafts recorded the positions of the parties, which differed on many points but at the same time were close or even identical on a considerable number of specific formulations. Thus there exists a number of documents which can be used as a point of departure for further discussion.

52. The experience of international negotiations on disarmament accumulated during those years and the agreement which was reached on some partial disarmament measures and which has now been given expression in international treaties enable us to hope that also in questions of general and complete disarmament we can continue to seek mutually acceptable solutions by utilizing everything positive that has been done so far.

53. Noteworthy in this connexion is the proposal made by the Chairman of today's meeting, the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, in the First Committee at the twenty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly (A/C.1/PV.1609, provisional, pp. 62 and 63-65) and subsequently reiterated in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC/PV.397, para. 95) regarding the study of the possibility of co-ordinating the measures which had previously been proposed for implementation during the first stage of disarmament and which have not yet become the subject of agreement. We believe that this proposal deserves careful study. The approach to the disarmament problem on which this proposal is based, has much in common with the proposals in the Soviet Government's memorandum on disarmament (ENDC/227) of 1 July 1968.

54. The members of our Committee will recall that the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament provided for the destruction in the first stage of disarmament of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, including rockets -- except for a certain number of intercontinental missiles -- and of aircraft, warships and artillery systems capable of serving as means of delivering nuclear weapons. It also provided for the simultaneous dismantling of military bases in foreign territories, which are the source of military conflicts. Thus already in the first stage of our programme for general and complete disarmament the implementation of measures for the elimination of

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the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and for the dismantling of military bases would enable States appreciably to reduce and virtually to preclude the possibility of one country attacking another with the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

55. Since the Western Powers have not agreed to the implementation of this programme, we now propose that this problem be solved in parts, beginning with the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the limitation and subsequent reduction of the means of delivery of strategic weapons, the prohibition of flights beyond national borders of bomber aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, the limitation of navigation zones for missile-carrying submarines and the liquidation of foreign military bases. It is obvious that these proposals are also designed to limit or preclude completely the possibility of a nuclear attack by one country against another. The accomplishment of these measures would not only be a substantial step forward in solving specific questions of disarmament but would also help to create an international atmosphere favourable to further disarmament negotiations.

56. It is clear from what I have said that the measures provided for in the first stage of disarmament under the Soviet draft treaty and the proposals set out in the Soviet memorandum of 1 July 1968 are aimed at one and the same goal. The only difference is that of approach. In one case these measures are proposed as the first stage of an over-all programme of disarmament by stages, whereas in the second case they are proposed as individual measures designed to open the way to general and complete disarmament.

57. The Soviet Union is prepared to take either of those roads and to solve the problem of disarmament in an over-all manner, by stages, or again in parts, through the implementation of partial measures. Moreover, we are prepared to discuss the aforesaid measures and ways to reach agreement on their implementation either separately or in regard to the whole set of measures simultaneously.

58. We should like to note also that discussions will be fruitful only if all the parties concerned show readiness to reach agreement. During the negotiations on general and complete disarmament which took place from 1962 to 1964 the Soviet Union was invariably guided by the desire to find mutually acceptable solutions which would meet the interests of peace and safeguard the security of the peoples, and it repeatedly went half-way to meet its partners in the negotiations. Thus, in an attempt to help bring the positions closer together, the Soviet Union altered its original proposals concerning the time limits for the implementation of disarmament, the levels of armed forces, the scale of reduction of conventional armaments, and so on.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

59. In view of the apprehensions expressed by the United States and some other Western Powers concerning the simultaneous elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the first stage of disarmament, as proposed in its original draft treaty, the Soviet Union proposed the so-called nuclear missile "umbrella" (A/PV.1127, paras. 76-77). We proposed that, until the end of the third and last stage of complete disarmament, the United States and the Soviet Union should retain a strictly limited number of delivery vehicles with nuclear warheads. The Soviet Union also expressed its willingness to accept a number of measures proposed by the United States for diminishing the danger of war in the first stage of disarmament. However, the steps proposed and taken by the Soviet Union in order to find mutually acceptable solutions met with no response on the part of the Western Powers.

60. The Soviet delegation is firmly convinced of the necessity of taking decisive steps to work out a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The interests of mankind, the interests of future generations, urgently require us to remove the obstacles from the road leading to general and complete disarmament and, first and foremost, the main obstacle, the arms race, spurred on by certain Western countries members of NATO.

61. In its aforementioned statement of 10 April of this year the Soviet Union appealed to the countries members of the North Atlantic Alliance to put an end to the arms race and to embark on the road to disarmament. The statement says:

> "the adoption of measures aimed at implementing disarmament is increasingly urgent. The Soviet Government is firmly convinced of the necessity resolutely and steadfastly to make progress towards disarmament, whatever efforts may be required, because there are no better or more reliable ways and means of ensuring true security and lasting peace."

62. In advocating the continuation of negotiations on general and complete disarmament the Soviet delegation is convinced that if during these negotiations all the parties concerned show a constructive approach and a sincere endeavour to reach agreement on this cardinal problem of disarmament, the said problem will be solved, however complex it may be.

63. In conclusion, we should like to express the hope that the other delegations will also deem it possible to set forth in the Committee their views on these urgent questions upon which the future of mankind depends.

64. The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): I wish now to speak as the representative of Sweden.

The Committee has started a most interesting discussion on the item of our agenda called "the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed". (ENDC/236, p.3). As I had occasion to point out in my first intervention at this session (ENDC/PV.397, para. 101), this is in no small way due to the initiative of the delegation of the Soviet Union in having put forward at the very opening meeting of the Committee a full draft treaty text covering the subject (ENDC/240).

65. It is now incumbent on all delegations to contribute to our progress on this item by commenting on the Soviet draft. I am very glad to note that the view that I expressed earlier (ENDC/PV.397, para.102), that discussion of drafting points also in informal meetings would help prepare the way for agreement, seems to be shared by several delegations.

66. Today I want to make a more general tour d'horizon of the issue, in order to stress that progress is urgent. In the first instance it is important to grasp the opportunity to arrive at agreements, as is still possible in this case, to ban undesirable developments before they actually occur, rather than try later to restrict and eliminate them when they have become firmly entrenched. Also, this Committee will need the precious time allotted to it for several other disarmament measures of even more immediate importance for securing peace than building legal barrages against a future arms race on the sea-bed.

67. Let me first pass in review the kinds of military installations which -- as we understand it -- might be installed on the sea-bed, now or in the near future, in order to proceed thereafter to examine which of them must and can be ruled out. This should indicate the desirable scope of the prohibitory regulations of an agreement to preserve the sea-bed for peaceful purposes. Obviously, it is not possible for the representative of a small country to deal in a fully authoritative manner with this issue. Few nations possess first-hand knowledge of its technical and military background. However, an increasing flow of published material is available; an example of this is the working paper prepared last year by the United Nations Secretariat at the request of the Ad-Hoc Committee on the sea-bed -- "The military uses of the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction" (A/AC.135/28 of 10 July 1968).

68. All authoritative writers on the subject agree that military factors are playing a vital role in the growing concern about sea-bed developments. One commentator has even stated that the total potential for war in the future will be largely determined by its undersea component. The possibility is thus foreseen of intensive deployment

(The Chairman, Sweden)

of undersea weapons and operational military craft capable of utilizing the ocean floor as a base for their activities. The military budgets of the great Powers in so far as they are published, indicate quite substantial sums for research and development connected with what is called "anti-submarine warfare" and other projects related to the sea-bed.

69. The most striking possible use of the sea-bed for military purposes -- and also probably the most dangerous one -- concerns underwater missile bases for nuclear weapons. As the super-Powers now possess good resources for surveillance of each other's land territories, through satellites, there seems to be growing concern that they might choose to try hiding missiles either above, on, or in the ocean floor. Such a base could be fitted into the floor itself or be anchored to the sea-bed. Either type would be almost impossible to detect once it had been installed. The tracking devices now being developed and deployed in order to follow the movements of submarines would, we believe, probably not be effective against such immobile bases.

70. Already today the sea-bed can be used militarily for anchoring mines. Mines can also be placed on the sea-bed. In addition to conventional types there may exist or be developed mines with nuclear explosives. Other military uses concern storing vital supplies -- for instance, fissionable material or weapons -- in "caches" in the sea-bed; communications facilities and monitoring devices; and base facilities for submarines, as well as the introduction of defence structures against various weapons. Establishments for civilian purposes, such as oil extraction units, could be combined with a military installation, such as a missile base or an observation post.

71. We are not dealing here with developments pertaining to a distant future. The technical possibilities for achieving all these projects seem to exist today. The potential realization of new developments will be dependent mainly on the underwater depth at which the various installations can be placed, for technical or economic reasons.

72. When turning from a review of possible prospects to attempts to forestall them by international action, my delegation feels strongly that the overriding principle should be to protect the sea-bed from any utilization, any installations, which could form an obstacle to the fulfilment of that grand design on the part of the international community which is to carry out -- to use the words of General Assembly resolution 2467 A (XXIII) -- the exploration and explcitation of the resources of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof:

(The Chairman, Sweden)

"... for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geographical location of States, taking into account the special interests and needs of the developing countries".

73. I wish also to remind members of the Committee, in this context, of the statement in the preamble to the outer space Treaty that:

"... the exploration and use of outer space should be carried on for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the degree of their economic or scientific developments" (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), annex:)

and, quoting from article I of that Treaty, that outer space "shall be the province of all mankind".

74. The vast ocean bed certainly is the province of all mankind and is probably its last great reservoir of riches. It cannot, therefore, be allowed to be made the object of "territorial" usurpation by individual States or the theatre of a race to emplace national installations which would act as obstacles to its exploration and future exploitation for the joint benefit of all countries. A régime for such international co-operation, prohibiting also national arrogation for "peaceful purposes", is what we expect to result from the work of the sea-bed Committee; but here in the Eighteen-Nation Committee we are, of course, engaged in the primordial task of keeping the sea-bed clear of military impediments.

75. Explicit international legislation to that effect has hitherto been lacking. Some guidance may, however, be derived from the Geneva Conventions of 1958. The Convention on the High Seas of 29 April 1958 [1] indicates that "no State may validly purport to subject any part of /the high seas/ to its sovereignty"; and the Convention on the Continental Shelf of the same date [2] authorizes only installations for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources. We must therefore prepare legislation so as to forestall the installation of military devices on the sea-bed outside the territorial waters of the coastal State, by a demilitarization agreement. That would amount to a very timely "non-armament" measure. It would have the same conflict-preventing character as the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 [3] and the outer space Treaty of 1967.

1/ United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 450, pp. 82 et seq.

2/ ibid., vol. 499, pp. 311 et seq.

3/ ibid., vol. 402, pp. 71 et seq.

(The Chairman, Sweden)

76. With those general principles in mind my delegation greeted with positive interest the draft treaty text put forward by the Soviet delegation in document ENDC/240. We have studied it with considerable care. The ensuing debate here in the Committee, as well as the preliminary exchange of views in the United Nations, has been concentrated mainly on three points demanding specification, as was underlined by the representative of the United Kingdom in his statement at our meeting of 17 April (ENDC/PV.404, paras. 22-23) and by the representative of Brazil today. They are as follows:

(a) what should be the scope of the prohibition to be arrived at or, more concretely, what weapons or military measures should be prohibited?

(b) how, in this context, should the prohibited area be delimited?

(c) how should control be arranged?

I should like to indicate in general terms the thinking -- which is, of course, provisional so far -- of my Government on those three points.

77. The prohibition must encompass all military installations. If the prohibition is not made total, any control will become unwieldy, not to say impossible. Therefore agreed definitions will be needed so as to demarcate clearly what is meant by expressions such as "for peaceful purposes" and "military installations".

78. The geographical area to be covered by the prohibition should be as large as possible. If, for instance, the parts of the continental shelves over which coastal States today claim limited national sovereignty were to be excluded from the demilitarized area, none of the seas adjacent to the coasts of my country -- neither the Baltic nor the eastern parts of the North Sea -- would be covered by the agreement but would be open to military installations, possibly directly confronting each other. The situation would be even more precarious in many parts of the world. As the very definition of what constitutes the continental shelf is open-ended, the risks of conflicts in attempts at delimitation would be endless.

79. Our conclusion is that a line should preferably be established at a fixed distance from the coastal base lines which would form the delimitation. Outside that border line, military installations on the sea-bed would be forbidden; inside it the coastal State would have free option. Unless we strive for the most clear-cut formula in this context the agreement we may ultimately arrive at will be of limited value only.

(The Chairman, Sweden)

80. To find a solution on the no less important question of control we might compare the formula used in the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 with that used in the outer-space Treaty of 1967.

81. Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty provides that in order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the Treaty provisions, the Parties have the right to carry out inspections through designated observers. Those observers have complete freedom of access at any time to any area of Antarctica. The right of inspection includes all stations, installations and equipment within Antarctica, as well as all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel. Aerial observation may be carried out at any time. The parties are further obliged to notify each other of all expeditions and stations within Antarctica as well as of any military personnel or equipment they intend to utilize there.

82. The corresponding provisions in the outer-space Treaty, article XII, are definitely more limited in scope. They provide that all stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the moon and other celestial bodies shall be open to other parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity. Before a projected visit can take place, reasonable advance notice must, however, be given and appropriate consultations be held to ensure safety and to avoid interference with normal operations in the facility to be visited.

83. The formula used in the Antarctic Treaty seems to us preferable as a model, but is, of course, a matter for further debate within the Committee.

84. It has been natural for our delegation to view the Soviet draft text in the light of the principles I have just outlined. I shall now proceed, therefore, to somewhat more detailed comments and to some queries following the Soviet text in document ENDC/240.

85. The preamble to a final treaty should perhaps, in addition to the paragraphs contained in the Soviet draft, reproduce some of the language used in the principal United Nations resolutions on related matters. I am thinking particularly of passages such as those I have quoted earlier and some which would bring the text more in line with the contents of the preamble to the outer-space Treaty. One formulation used in connexion with outer space, but not finally retained in the preamble to that Treaty, is: "Desiring to avoid the extension of present national rivalries into this new field" (General Assembly resolution 1472 (XIV)). I submit this as a suitable paragraph

(The Chairman, Sweden)

in a somewhat extended preamble to the sea-bed Treaty because the avoidance of national conflicts is exactly what we want to achieve first of all.

86. It might also be useful to give reference in the preamble to some of the already existing treaties concerning the law of the sea in order to make clear that their provisions have been taken into account. I am thinking particularly of the Convention on the High Seas and its provisions concerning the freedom of the sea and safeguarding navigation and fisheries, as well as the laying and maintenance of submarine cables and pipelines on the bed of the high seas. The Convention on the Continental Shelf might also be mentioned. A careful study of those and perhaps other treaties to make sure that the results of our work will not be in conflict with any of their provisions is obviously necessary.

87. To turn now to the substantive parts of the Soviet draft treaty, the delimitation contained in article 1, which suggests the figure of twelve miles -- a figure that may of course be discussed. The great virtue of the language used here lies in the choice of a definite limit, equal for all States, irrespective of present delimitation of their territorial waters or the possibilities of extending limited jurisdiction over parts of the continental shelf. For one thing, the continental shelf is unevenly distributed between various areas of the globe. The possible expansion of certain limited rights of the coastal State has, as is well known, been made dependent, in the Convention of 1958, on technical capacities. This would give States with more advanced technological methods a possibility to extend their jurisdiction considerably further than States deprived of those means.

88. The second paragraph of article 1 in the Soviet draft brings us to the main issue: what types of military uses are to be prohibited. I think we may work from the two extremes: cables on the sea-bed definitely allowed; installations containing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction definitely prohibited. We have studied with great care the statement made by the United States representative, Ambassador Smith, on 25 March 1969, in which he argued the case for prohibiting the emplacement of the latter kind of weapons only, while stating that the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed "would ... be simply unworkable and probably harmful" (ENDC/PV.397, para. 34).

89. We can, however, see no ground for accepting that reasoning. If the ultimate purpose of our endeavours is to keep the sea-bed open for international pursuits for peaceful purposes and to ensure the freedom of the seas -- which is, after all, the generally accepted aim -- the sea-bed should not be dotted with different kinds of

(The Chairman, Sweden)

installations for military purposes. If, however, there should ultimately be general acceptance of a prohibition which would be subject to a few exceptions, these would have to be clearly defined and stated in the treaty. The Antarctic and outer-space Treaties could give useful guidance, there again, as to suitable language.

90. Article 2 of the Soviet draft contains the provisions on control. Ambassador Roshchin pointed out in his statement on 3 April that:

> "Should an agreement on a comprehensive ban on military activities on the sea-bed and the ocean floor be concluded, the parties could apply the principle of free access to objects placed on the sea-bed in order to verify compliance with the treaty." (ENDC/PV.40C, para. 24).

91. We agree fully with that standpoint. The moment no military installations are permitted all installations and objects on the sea-bed can be inspected as they will be connected with peaceful activities only. However -- and I come back to this possible qualification -- should the final outcome of our negotiations as to the scope of the prohibition contain certain exceptions, thus allowing for the installation of some structures of a military nature on the sea-bed, it would seem necessary that a process of obligatory notification be introduced.

92. I come now to the concept of reciprocity introduced in article 2 of the Soviet draft. To us this is obscure. It might be interpreted as meaning "open to other parties which also have installations on the sea-bed". But the meaning must surely be rather "open on a non-descriminatory basis for inspection by all parties to the treaty". We should welcome clarification on this point. It is also important to recall the possibility that inspection may come to be carried out through an international undertaking.

93. How the inspection could be realized is an important question in this connexion on which it would be interesting to have the views of other delegations. Submarines might conceivably have to be used; diving-bells for the greater depths and underwater television cameras. Magnetic detectors might be useful in order to localize metal structures on the sea-bed which might then have to be identified further by any of the methods mentioned earlier or by yet other methods. As States have different capacities for participating in this form of control, some sort of international co-operation may be necessary.

(The Chairman, Sweden)

94. Article 3 of the Soviet draft is acceptable to us.

95. On article 4 I should like to make the comment that the question of the names of the future depositary Governments, left blank in the draft, is of considerable importance. It does not seem to be indicated that the three nuclear-weapon Powers should in all disarmament treaties retain the special position as depositary Governments which they have had hitherto, involving, on the construction used in the recent treaty texts as well as in this one, the veto power on their part as to the entry into force of the treaties in question.

96. In this context we think also that the number of ratifications -- that is, five -- suggested in the Soviet draft for the entry into force of the treaty is far too small. This treaty will be an important one and a greater number of ratifications should be needed to trigger off its coming into being. This would be particularly important if our final product were not comprehensive in its prohibitions. One might suggest the same number of ratifications as is prescribed in the Geneva Conventions of 1958 on the law of the sea -- that is, twenty-two States. Needless to say, the adherence of such States as China and France in addition to the main Powers represented here would be particularly welcome. We might all think of ways to secure such adherence.

97. I wish to end my statement today with a further reminder of the urgency of this matter. If we fail to reach our agreement soon, an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor seems inevitable. Even if only the super-Powers could be the instigators of such a venture, all States would become involved in its consequences. In the first place it might lead to extravagant claims of sovereignty by individual States over parts of the sea-bed under international waters. Further, it would most certainly create increased international tension and might jeopardize existing and also future systems of balance of power. Finally, it would seem likely that such a race between the main Powers would not be confined to a search for military advantages but would cover economic and commercial prerogatives as well.

98. We should keep in mind the fact that the military aspects constitute only one part of the complex issue of the sea-bed. Important as is the prevention of its militarization, international regulations of its exploration and exploitation for peaceful purposes is of immediate urgency also. We all know that this aspect is the main concern of the Committee on the sea-bed set up by the General Assembly in 1968 (resolution 2467 A (XXIII)).

(The Chairman, Sweden)

However, the speedy and successful conclusion of our labours constitutes a prerequisite, I think, for the success of its endeavour to create machinery for joint international co-operation to ensure that the resources of the sea-bed will benefit mankind as a whole.

99. Mr. CARACCIOLO (Italy) (translation from French): I merely wish to make a brief statement in order to present document ENDC/245, which has been distributed by the Secretariat at our request.

100. In its statement on 25 March the Italian delegation expressed its views on our future work (ENDC/PV.397, paras. 50-84). I think I am right in saying that a number of delegations were interested in those views. Not only did the representative of Sweden (ibid. para. 95) and the representative of Mexico (ENDC/PV.402, para.36) refer to them in their previous statements but we seemed to detect some ideas fairly close to our own among those expounded by the representative of Romania (ENDC/PV.400, paras.75-97) and the representative of India (ENDC/PV.404, paras. 39 et seq.).

101. The comments on the subject of general and complete disarmament that we have just heard from the representative of Brazil and the representative of the Soviet Union have also reminded us of the complex and delicate problems connected with this basic task of our Committee.

102. Since our previous intervention our Committee has had the benefit of the contributions of several other delegations which, in regard to specific and very precise fields, have suggested proposals and developed particularly constructive ideas, concerning which, however, contradictory opinions have been expressed.

103. That leads us to believe that the balance of interests which is the foundation of any possible agreement and which was quite rightly called for by the representative of the United Arab Republic in his statement on 15 April (ENDC/PV.403, para.20) is all the more difficult to achieve as the search for it is limited by the necessarily narrow framework of each specific measure. To go beyond that framework in order to find that balance in an organic programme of disarmament would, on the contrary, facilitate our task. I wish to stress that that idea does not, of course, involve any element of rigidity. On the contrary, in the working paper that we are presenting we conceive it in a supple and flexible manner. The need for an organic programme therefore does not, in our opinion, exclude negotiation, and perhaps agreement, in the specific fields listed in the agenda of our work (ENDC/236, p.3) but, quite to the contrary, greatly encourages it.

(Mr. Caracciolo, Italy)

104. This necessity for an organic programme has, moreover, been felt ever since the beginning of our work in 1961 and 1962. Indeed, the Joint Statement (ENDC/5) by the United States and the Soviet Union, and the programmes for general and complete disarmament of the two great Powers (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Corr.1 and ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1-3) date from that time. Subsequently, with a view to avoiding the difficulties which were bound to arise with plans on such a scale, another way was chosen by tackling the problem through the study of individual collateral measures.

105. It is therefore high time that we came back to the sources, that we returned to the origins of our work, which at the same time constitute the final goal. That final goal is, moreover, the only one which speaks a clear and convincing language, a language which is understood and spoken with equal fervour by the entire human race without distinction.

106. The necessary balance between the different measures of disarmament to which I have just referred meets not only a political need but also very precise requirements for technical balance.

107. All those balances -- and still others -- must be found. The aim of the Italian delegation in having its working paper circulated is to facilitate this search by opening the way to an exchange of profitable ideas.

108. The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): I have been asked to read the following communication from the two co-Chairmen:

"The co-Chairmen have consulted other members about suggestions made during the informal meeting on 16 April. It was the consensus among members that additional informal as well as formal meetings can be held on Wednesdays upon the request of any delegation. If any delegation wishes to call for an informal Wednesday meeting, the co-Chairmen should be notified. It was the general feeling that the meetings might be more useful if requests were made at a reasonable time in advance.

"The co-Chairmen suggest that an informal meeting be held on 30 April to discuss the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed."

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 405th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Mrs. Alva Myrdal, representative of Sweden.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Brazil, the USSR, Sweden and Italy.

"The delegation of Italy submitted a working paper setting forth suggestions for the adoption of an organic disarmament programme (ENDC/245).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 24 April 1969, at 10.30 a.m.".

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.406
24 April 1969
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SIXTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 24 April 1969, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:	Mr. S.A. FRAZAO
	Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
	Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA
	Mr. J. NOGUEIRA FILHO
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. CHRISTOV
	Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
	Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV
Burma:	U KYAW MIN
Canada:	Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
	Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL
	Mr. J.R. MORDEN
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. T. LAHODA
	Mr. V. VAJNAR
	Mr. V. SAFAR
	Mr. J. STRUCKA
Ethiopia:	Mr. A. ZELLEKE
India:	Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
	Mr. N. KRISHNAN
	Mr. K.P. JAIN
Italy:	Mr. R. CARACCIOLO
	Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI
	Mr. R. BORSARELLI
	Mr. U. PESTALOZZA
Mexico:	Miss E. AGUIRRE
	Mr. H. CARDENAS RODRIGUEZ
Nigeria:	Mr. L.A. MALIKI

Poland:	Mr. H. JAROSZEK
	Mr. K. ZYBLSKI
	Mr. H. STROSZ
	Mr. R. LAZLO
Romania:	Mr. N. ECOHESCO
	Mr. V. CONSTANTINESCO
	Mr. V. TARZIORU
	Mr. C. GEORGESCO
Sweden:	Mrs. A. MYRDAL
	Mr. A. EDELSTAM
	Mr. T. WULFF
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
	Mr. O.A. GRINEVSKY
	Mr. I.I. TCHEPROV
	Mr. N.S. KISHILOV
United Arab Republic:	Mr. H. KHALLAF
	Mr. O. SIRRY
	Mr. E.S. El REEDY
	Mr. M. ISMAIL
United Kingdom:	Mr. I.F. PORTER
	Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY
	Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
	Mr. M.E. HOWELL
United States of America:	Mr. A.S. FISHER
	Mr. C. GLEYSTEEN
	Mr. W. GIVAN
	Mr. R.L. McCORMACK
Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. D. PROTITCH
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(translation from Russian): I declare open the 406th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

2. Mr. JAROSZEK (Poland): It is gratifying to note that almost all the interventions we have heard in this Committee during the present session rightly expressed the view that the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*) is a very important achievement. The rapid implementation of the Treaty could indeed mark the beginning of a new stage in disarmament and security negotiations.

3. The Polish delegation in this Committee has always been of the opinion that while pursuing our main task of elaborating a treaty on general and complete disarmament we should seek agreements in other fields which, though not always disarmament measures sensu stricto, would contribute to the slowing down of the arms race and would facilitate the attainment of our main goal. Guided by that approach, we have put forward a number of collateral measures ourselves and we analyse in the same spirit the proposals put forward by other members of this Committee.

4. Today I should like to dwell on the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/240) submitted here by the Soviet delegation on 18 March, on the prohibition of the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. But before I present the position of my delegation on this subject may I be permitted to make a few remarks concerning our main task -- that is, the preparation of a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament. Almost all delegations have touched on this question at this session of the Committee and the representative of the Soviet Union -- that is, the Chairman of today's meeting -- devoted to it a special intervention (ENDC/PV.405, paras.36 et seq.) at our meeting on 22 April.

5. It is worth recalling, I think, that about this time seven years ago two significant documents were presented to this Committee. One was a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control (ENDC/2*) submitted by the delegation of the USSR. The other was an outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world (ENDC/30 and Corr.1) presented by the delegation of the United States. If one takes into account the time factor envisaged for the different stages of disarmament in the two documents, we should by now be living

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

in a disarmed world, probably discussing in another United Nations body big development projects -- projects which would have been made possible by the release of the resources used for the production of armaments. Unfortunately in reality, as we have been reminded by the Secretary-General, U Thant (ENDC/PV.395, para.4) the yearly world military expenditure has increased since 1962 from $120,000 million to more than $180,000 million.

6. It cannot be denied, however, that in the course of disarmament negotiations some significant results have been achieved, of which the latest, the non-proliferation Treaty, is undoubtedly of the greatest importance. On the other hand, we cannot forget that the agreements achieved so far consist of measures of a preventive nature, while the talks on general and complete disarmament practically have not left the stage of general debate as yet. Meanwhile the capacity for destruction has attained such a level that the very existence of mankind is constantly threatened. In such a situation it is not enough to express verbally one's commitment to the cause of peace, for so long as a system of nuclear weapons of an over-kill capacity is considered to be the basis for maintaining peace, so long will that peace remain highly precarious and indeed rather artificial. For years we have been repeating that it is the imminent possibility of a nuclear war that makes peace, in a system of collective security, so urgent.

7. From the very beginning of the disarmament negotiations Poland has insisted that the most important and urgent measures favouring the achievement of general and complete disarmament are those conducive to putting an end as quickly as possible to the threat of a nuclear war. May I in this respect recall operative paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 2454 B (XXIII)(ENDC/237) requesting this Committee to make renewed efforts towards achieving substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and urgently to analyse the plans already under consideration and others that might be put forward to see how, in particular, rapid progress could be made in the field of nuclear disarmament. The Polish delegation believes that a proper response to this demand should be an agreement dealing with specific measures of nuclear disarmament which should be carried out at the beginning of the disarmament process. Such an agreement or agreements should provide for definite time limits for the implementation of different measures.

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

8. In this connexion it might be suggested that the co-Chairmen prepare a new draft agreement for the first stage of disarmament, a draft that would take into account the measures I have just mentioned.

9. As far as Poland is concerned, we are ready to play our part. In particular, we shall continue our efforts aiming at the establishment of lasting peace and security in Europe. We are convinced that regional disarmament measures will facilitate the removal of the main causes of tension, on the basis of existing political and territorial realities in Europe. Our first disarmament objective in Europe, as we have conceived it in our proposals (ENDC/C.1/1) for a nuclear-weapon-free zone and a nuclear "freeze", is to seek agreements on specific issues, agreements designed to eliminate the risk of a nuclear confrontation and to promote the prospect of collective security.

10. We realize that a number of difficult problems in Europe await solutions. But even a single agreement in the field of disarmament will make progress possible in other fields and will facilitate political solutions from which both East and West would benefit. The main ideas which I have been trying to expound are contained, it may be recalled, in the Budapest Appeal of 17 March by the States members of the Warsaw Pact addressed to all European States (ENDC/243).

11. I should like to turn now to the second problem I wish to discuss this morning, namely, the question of banning all military activities on the sea-bed and the ocean floor. My delegation has carefully studied the draft treaty presented by the Soviet Union (ENDC/240). We listened with interest to the detailed explanations concerning the draft treaty which were so ably and convincingly presented by you, Mr. Chairman, in your capacity as the representative of the USSR, in your statements on 18 March (ENDC/PV.395, paras.80-88) and 3 April (ENDC/PV.400, paras.2-36). The Polish delegation shares the following opinion expressed by the representative of the United Arab Republic, Ambassador Khallaf, on 15 April:

> "We feel that this draft reflects our basic position on the problem, which is to prohibit all military weapons and military activity on the sea-bed". (ENDC/PV.403, para.34)

We are also in full agreement with the view of the representative of India, Ambassador Husain, who stated on 17 April:

> "We should like to see the area of the sea-bed and ocean floor exploited exclusively for peaceful purposes". (ENDC/PV.404, para.66)

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

12. I am glad to note that a number of other representatives have expressed similar views. I should like to mention, in particular, the very interesting statement made on 22 April by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal. My delegation fully agrees with the Swedish point of view that "the prohibition must encompass all military installations" (ENDC/PV.405, para. 77) and, further, that "the geographical area to be covered by the prohibition should be as large as possible" (ibid.)

13. It has been stated repeatedly by nearly all the representatives in this Committee -- and the same is also true of the First Committee of the United Nations -- that it is incontestably easier to preclude an arms race in fields or regions where such a race has not yet started than to reduce armaments in areas where they have already been introduced. This is so self-evident that one hardly needs to enumerate examples in support of the argument. Let me, then, limit myself to two specific cases because both are greatly similar to the question we are now discussing.

14. I have in mind the Antarctic Treaty[1/] and the Treaty concerning the exploration of outer space (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI) annex) adopted in 1959 and 1966 respectively, after difficult but nevertheless relatively short and smooth negotiations when compared with our negotiations on disarmament. Their similarity to each other, as well as to the draft treaty on the demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor (ENDC/240), stems from the fact that they all apply to areas with similar juridical status and that all those areas are at present hardly accessible for normal human activities.

15. Article I of the Antarctic Treaty states:

> "Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military manoeuvres, as well as the testing of any type of weapons".

16. Article IV of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies states:

1/ United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 402, pp. 71 et seq.

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

"The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden".

17. I hope that I shall not be abusing your patience, Mr. Chairman, if in this connexion I quote article I of the draft treaty on the prohibition of the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union on 18 March 1969:

"The use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof beyond the twelve-mile maritime zone of coastal States is prohibited.

"It is prohibited to place on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoi thereof objects with nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction, and to set up military bases, structures, installations, fortifications and other objects of a military nature."

18. As can be seen, no special effort is required to observe that the Soviet draft treaty is based on the same ideas and principles as the two Treaties to which I have just referred. Since Poland is a party to those Treaties, we believe that it is only proof of a consistent policy for us to support also the Soviet draft treaty.

19. The Polish delegation is of the strong opinion that the demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor would be an important step on the way to achieving other disarmament measures sensu stricto. On the other hand, the limitation of the scope of the treaty to weapons of mass destruction alone would be contrary to General Assembly resolutions 2467 A (XXIII) and 2340 (XXII) on the question of the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. Such a limitation might also be interpreted by some States as complete freedom to set up conventional military installations on the sea-bed and the ocean floor, for example, in the vicinity of the territorial waters of other States, which would inevitably lead to the escalation of international tension.

20. Another argument against the limitation of the scope of the proposed treaty is that modern sophisticated weapons, such as missiles, torpedoes, mines and so on, can be used for both conventional and nuclear means of warfare. It is true that

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

economists may argue that it would not pay to install on the bottom of the sea platforms or other launching devices for non-nuclear missiles because their cost would outweigh their military significance. But, as we all know, such arguments have not always prevailed, and the possibility of using conventional installations for nuclear means of warfare in a critical situation may be tempting. The road to such possible future temptations and risks should, therefore, be barred before it is too late.

21. It seems to us that the implementation of the treaty banning the use for any military purpose of the sea-bed and the ocean floor could be more adequately verified than could the observance of a treaty providing for a partial ban related to weapons of mass destruction only. Here again the Soviet draft bears a fundamental similarity to the relevant article of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. As far as we know, since the entry into force of that Treaty there has been no complaint from States parties against other signatories of alleged violations of the Treaty provisions. That means that the verification system provided for in that agreement has met the expectations. We note with satisfaction that the draft we have before us is based on the same principle as the verification system established under the Antarctic Treaty -- a system which has proved to be efficacious in practice.

22. We are witnessing at present a tremendous development of science and technology and we should not be surprised if in only a few years from now the establishment of military installations even on the deep ocean floor becomes less difficult than the setting up of similar installations in Antarctica today or on the moon tomorrow. Therefore, if we in this Committee really want to preclude an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor — as I believe we do — we should concert our efforts with a view to reaching, as speedily as possible, an agreement providing for the full demilitarization of those areas.

23. We are in full agreement with the opinion expressed here by the representative of Mexico on 10 April, when he urged that progress in this field should be achieved in the course of the present session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee (ENDC/PV.402, para. 27).

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

24. The territorial scope of the proposed prohibition is of no less importance than its substantive provisions. It is closely linked with a controversial issue in international law, namely, how far the jurisdiction of coastal States extends in the direction of the high sea, both on the sea surface and on the sea-bed adjacent to the coastal State. Two Geneva conferences, held in 1958 and 1960 respectively, and the four Geneva Conventions of 1958 and the law of the seas have not succeeded in establishing a universally accepted solution of that so often disputed problem. The solution provided for in the draft treaty presented by the delegation of the Soviet Union seems to advance a very effective way of overcoming that difficulty for the purposes of the treaty.

25. My delegation is of the opinion that it would not be practical to link the external limits of the zone beyond which the prohibition of military activities in the framework of the proposed treaty should apply to the limits of territorial waters or to the limits of the jurisdiction of States over the sea-bed or the continental shelf.

26. As we understand it, the Soviet draft provides for the establishment of a twelve-mile maritime zone on the adjacent sea-bed solely for the purposes of this treaty. The zone thus established would in no way imply the recognition or the rejection by the contracting parties of any claims to the territorial waters or the continental shelf.

27. I should like to recall that the establishment of a special maritime zone for a particular purpose is not without precedent in international law. For instance the second Geneva Convention of 1958[2] accords the coastal States the right to set up, in certain circumstances, special maritime zones for fiscal purposes or for customs, sanitary or immigration control, beyond the limits of territorial waters. (article 24) On the other hand, the fourth Geneva Convention of 1958[3] also provides in certain circumstances, for the establishment of special zones for the purpose of fishing. (article 7)

2/ Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 516, p. 205 et seq.

3/ Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas. United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 559, p. 285 et seq.

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

28. The outer limit of the twelve-mile maritime zone established for the purposes of the treaty should, in the opinion of the Polish delegation, be measured from the same base lines as are used in defining the limits of the territorial waters of coastal States. That is provided for in article 3 of the Soviet draft. However, from the legal point of view, that special zone, like the special zones provided for in the Geneva Conventions of 1958 on the law of the seas, would be completely independent of the concept of territorial waters or the concept of jurisdiction over the continental shelf.

29. Another argument strongly favouring the separation for the purpose of the treaty of the special zone from areas subject to the sovereignty and jurisdiction of coastal States may be found in article 2 of the third Geneva Convention of 1958, on the Continental Shelf.4/ That article states, inter alia, that:

"The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources".

Since there are seas, such as the Baltic Sea, whose entire subsoil is a continental shelf, the provisions of the envisaged treaty should necessarily cover such shallow seas also. My country is particularly interested in this question. We have noted that a similar concern was expressed by the representative of Sweden in her statement on 22 April (ENDC/PV.405, para. 78). My delegation is happy to note that the draft treaty deals with this question in the right way. The principle contained therein has already been introduced into practice by the signing on 23 October 1968 of the Declaration concerning the continental shelf of the Baltic Sea by the Governments of the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. That Declaration states, inter alia, that:

"The continental shelf of the Baltic Sea should be used by all States exclusively for peaceful purposes".

30. Poland is among the ten largest shipbuilders of the world. In our economic plans we provide for further development of this important branch of our industry. We realize that the shipping of tomorrow will be based mainly on large container units. For that reason the entrance to the Baltic Sea as well as to a number of important Baltic harbours, including Polish harbours, will have to be deepened. We believe that the conclusion and the entry into force of a treaty banning the use for

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4/ United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 499, p. 311 et seq.

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof will open the way to intensive peaceful international co-operation aimed at finding the most suitable solutions to problems of the kind I have just mentioned in respect to the Baltic Sea. We hope that the day is not too far off when all the Baltic States will join together in proclaiming the Baltic Sea a sea of peaceful relations among its coastal States.

31. In conclusion, allow me to express the conviction that this Committee will be able at its present session to achieve substantial progress in elaborating a treaty which will secure the use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor as well as their subsoil exclusively for peaceful purposes.

32. Mr. CHRISTOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): For some time -- indeed, perhaps ever since the beginning of the present session -- delegations in this Committee have been constantly wondering what would be the best way to make our discussion fruitful and to ensure that it leads to concrete results. The suggestions and proposals made in this respect unquestionably express the common concern of us all. Certainly there is nothing to be said against what appears, in the opinion of all delegations, to be a necessary condition for improving and accelerating our work.

33. However, we cannot fail to point out that it is necessary to bear in mind certain factors and, first of all, the time factor. More than a month has passed since the resumption of our work. If we follow our usual practice, we shall soon have to think of setting a date for the adjournment of this part of our session. In any case, we have only a few weeks left. Obviously, in that time it will not be possible for us to carry out a thorough study of all the questions on the agenda (ENDC/236,p.3) since there is a rather large number of them. Consequently, it would be more appropriate and useful to concentrate the attention of the Committee on two or three problems. That is how I have understood some of the suggestions made during recent meetings.

34. If that is so, and if we must decide which problems should thus be given the highest priority, it is essential, in our opinion, that we should be guided by certain basic ideas and, in the first place, by the idea of the need to take measures recognized as being absolutely indispensable and urgent in order to stop the arms race before it gains new ground; by the idea of the need to promote measures which can play a considerable role as tangible proofs of the political will to reverse the trend towards acceleration of the arms race; and also by the idea of the need to solve those problems which are ripe for solution in order, finally, to take a concrete step towards disarmament.

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

35. My delegation considers that three of the problems on the agenda meet objectively all the conditions required for a rapid solution and that, on the basis of the ideas I have just expressed, they must be examined as a matter of priority. I refer to the problems of the drafting of an international agreement to prohibit the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, the conclusion of a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons and the conclusion of an agreement to put an end to underground nuclear tests.

36. We shall revert on another occasion to the first of those problems -- the demilitarization of the sea-bed -- but since it has been raised, I would say in passing that it is more than necessary to speed up the discussion, because experience has shown that the more slowly one proceeds the greater is the risk that complications may arise. I do not need to dwell on another phenomenon that occurs fairly often, namely, that beating about the bush encourages those who have an interest in preventing the solution of a particular problem. The time lost by the negotiators is used by the promoters of the arms race.

37. Having said that, I should now like to make some brief comments on the other two questions, which, like that of the sea-bed, should, as we see it, receive our attention during the next few weeks in preference to any other question.

38. The position of the Bulgarian delegation on the first of those problems, namely, the conclusion of a convention outlawing the use of nuclear weapons, is well-known; it has been restated and explained on several occasions. The Bulgarian Government has always warmly supported and continues to support the idea of concluding a convention to that end as quickly as possible. We consider that such a convention would have a vast repercussion on the international situation and would contribute to creating a favourable climate for all the discussions on disarmament.

39. We are happy to note that this position has been adopted by the great majority of States in the world. During sessions of the United Nations General Assembly -- and whenever this problem is on the agenda -- the great majority of the representatives of the international community have expressed their categorical support for the prohibition of nuclear weapons, a prohibition which they regard as one of the most urgent needs of our time. However, I have ventured to revert to that question, not to recall things that do not need to be recalled, but rather to try to examine the problem in the light of certain new elements which, in our opinion, give reason for fresh hope. Those elements, in our opinion, are the following.

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

40. First of all, in the situation created by the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*) the conclusion of an agreement banning the use of nuclear weapons would create a new dimension on the legal and political levels for all non-nuclear-weapon countries which have acceded, or are going to accede, to the Treaty. For, as has been pertinently pointed out, such a ban would have the value of being a first practical step towards the elimination of inequalities and differences among States, based upon the possession or non-possession of nuclear weapons.

41. Secondly, it must be borne in mind that at present the solution of the problem depends only on the attitude and the positions in respect to it of the nuclear-weapon Powers. The position of the Soviet Union is well known. The Soviet Union has been asking for the outlawing of atomic weapons since the day they made their appearance. The Soviet Government gave this question first place in its memorandum of 1 July 1968 (ENDC/227). That position was reaffirmed by you, Mr. Chairman, in your capacity as representative of the Soviet Union, in the statement you made on Thursday 10 April (ENDC/PV.402, paras. 41 et seq.). In that important statement you stressed the will of the Soviet Union to seek new ways to resolve the problem of banning the use of nuclear weapons; and you explained that one of those ways was to assume, for example, an obligation not to use nuclear weapons as a means of attack.

42. In our opinion, this is a path which, together with other restraints -- such as the establishment of denuclearized zones -- could lead us to a whole series of political decisions which would undoubtedly have an extremely favourable influence on the development of relations between nuclear Powers and between nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, and on the Committee's chances of carrying on its work in a more propitious climate.

43. Finally, another element which encourages us to stress the urgency of the problem of banning nuclear weapons is the way in which the question of banning chemical and biological weapons is now posed. I shall not speak about that, since a more thorough discussion will be possible after the submission of the report of the group of experts that is now at work. However, as we did at the last session, we must point out again that chemical and bacteriological weapons are not the only ones in the category of weapons of mass destruction. If we were to try to establish a scale of horrors and put each weapon of mass destruction in its proper place in relation to the others, we feel it would be very difficult to say which weapon was the most horrible and the most lethal. In any event, we do not believe that nuclear weapons should be put at the bottom of the scale.

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

44. It is very comforting to hear it said that biological weapons are universally condemned. Allow me to observe in this connexion that if that is so, it is due to the universal condemnation of their use constituted by the Geneva Protocol of 1925. It is precisely the existence of an instrument of international law such as the Geneva Protocol that has created so powerful a current of opinion against the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons that the very idea of having recourse to such weapons is today intolerable and arouses universal indignation. We are convinced that the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons will play the same role.

45. That being the case, we have the right to believe and demand that all weapons of mass destruction, including in the first place the most powerful and the most terrifying, should likewise be condemned universally; otherwise, we should have to resign ourselves to thinking that the refusal by certain Powers to renounce the use of nuclear weapons is connected precisely with the terrible effectiveness of those weapons, which is beyond imagination. We feel that in seeking ways and means to stop the arms race and bring about nuclear disarmament, we have no right to deprive mankind of all the political and legal instruments which have proved their worth, as the Geneva Protocol has done. We should even devise others; we cannot allow ourselves to renounce such a powerful psychological and political means as the outlawing of nuclear weapons would undoubtedly be.

46. For all those reasons my delegation is of the opinion that the Committee should devote the most sustained efforts to the discussion of the problem of banning the use of nuclear weapons. In the present context of disarmament problems and in the light of the new ideas suggested, which in themselves already represent a considerable step forward, it is impossible, in our opinion, to agree that everything has been said and still less that everything has been done as regards the solution of a problem of such great importance.

47. One of the questions which have been in the forefront of our discussions for a number of years is the conclusion of an agreement to put an end to underground nuclear weapon tests. The importance of this question has been highlighted by a large number of documents. I shall confine myself to mentioning resolution 2455 k(XXIII) in which the General Assembly

> "Taking into account the existing possibilities of establishing, through international co-operation, a voluntary exchange of seismic data so as to create a better scientific basis for a national evaluation of seismic events",

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

"Recognizing the importance of seismology in the verification of the observance of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests," (ENDC/237) requested the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to take up as a matter of urgency the elaboration of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests.

48. The delegations which have taken part so far in the discussion, including the Bulgarian delegation, have all agreed in acknowledging that, in accordance with the aforesaid resolution, priority must be given to this problem. On 1 April 1969 the Swedish delegation submitted a "Working Paper with suggestions as to possible provisions of a Treaty Banning Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests" (ENDC/242). On behalf of my delegation, I congratulate the Swedish delegation on this initiative, which we consider to be a further contribution by it to the discussion of the problem - a contribution which we believe broadens the prospects for fruitful work in the right direction by the Committee.

49. The basic concept on which the document put forward by the Swedish delegation rests and the means which are set out therein for concluding an agreement are of great interest and merit the closest attention. We are convinced that the study of the concrete proposals contained in that document would bring us closer to our goal and would make it possible to draw up texts that could meet all the requirements to which such a treaty must respond.

50. The position of the Bulgarian delegation in that respect is quite clear. We firmly support the request for the prohibition of underground tests as an absolute necessity and as a pre-condition indissolubly linked to any further progress in the discussion on disarmament. We are convinced that a treaty prohibiting underground tests can be concluded on the basis of the possibilities of control using national means of detection that science has developed, and through an effective organization of scientific and technical apparatus for detecting and identifying the nature of seismic phenomena.

51. The progress recorded in this field during recent years offers a real safe-guard against any violation of an international treaty. One fact, we believe, is undeniable, namely that with the present level of improvement of instruments for detecting seismic phenomena and with an appropriate geographical distribution, it would be impossible for anyone to conduct an underground test and to violate the concluded agreement. In this respect we share the opinion of the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, who said:

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

"It is my strong conviction, in spite of assertions to the contrary by some Powers, that the technical control issue cannot be regarded as the decisive problem. The crux is political." (ENDC/PV.399, para. 12)

During my first intervention, on 27 March, I pointed out that the solution of disarmament problems depends on a definite political choice, and the result obtained is, in the final analysis, only the expression of a resolute political will (ENDC/PV.398, para. 4).

52. The negotiation of the problem of the total prohibition of nuclear tests affords in this respect a most significant example and irrefutable proof of the fact that it is the lack of a political choice that causes the possibility of an agreement to fade away each time an effort is designed to bring us closer to the solution.

53. The choice at present is between a policy of arms race and a policy of disarmament. It seems to us that throughout our discussion much has been said - and on many occasions - about the alleged risks of disarmament, while almost every day the risks, the real risks, of the arms race are increasing, a race of which underground tests are the most disturbing aspect at the present time.

54. We are far from wishing to simplify matters, but it is clear that at the stage at which we have arrived a solution of this vitally important problem can be regarded as within the reach of the Committee. All the factors are there for us to engage in a thorough discussion with a view to concluding within the shortest time an agreement which would open the way to other disarmament measures, as well as new prospects in the field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

55. We are encouraged by the fact that a number of delegations in our Committee have reached the conclusion that it is not technical requirements that are barring the way to an agreement on the cessation of underground tests. Without any doubt, at this decisive stage of our work, only a firm and unequivocal political decision would make it possible to overcome the remaining obstacles.

56. The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): In my capacity as Chairman of today's meeting I should like to make the following announcement on behalf of the two co-Chairmen.

"A request has been received from the delegation of the United Kingdom for the convening on 14 May 1969 of an informal meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to discuss the question of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons" --

to use the wording of the Committee's agenda.

(The Chairman, USSR)

"A request has also been received from the delegation of Sweden for the convening on 21 May of an informal meeting of the Committee to discuss the question of a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons.

"In accordance with the agreed procedure for convening informal meetings, those two meetings will be held, in conformity with the requests made to the co-Chairmen, on 14 May and 21 May at 10.30 a.m."

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 406th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador A.A. Roshchin, representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Poland and Bulgaria.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 29 April 1969, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.407
29 April 1969
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SEVENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 29 April 1969, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. H. KHALLAF (United Arab Republic)

GE.69-9493
69-35383

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:	Mr. S.A. FRAZAO
	Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA
	Mr. J. NOGUEIRA FILHO
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. CHRISTOV
	Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
	Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV
Burma:	U CHIT MYAING
	U KYAW MIN
Canada:	Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
	Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL
	Mr. J.R. MORDEN
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. T. LAHODA
	Mr. V. VAJNAR
	Mr. V. SAFAR
	Mr. J. STRUCKA
Ethiopia:	Mr. A. ZELLEKE
India:	Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
	Mr. N. KRISHNAN
	Mr. K.P. JAIN
Italy:	Mr. R. CARACCIOLO
	Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI
	Mr. R. BORSARELLI
	Mr. U. PESTALOZZA
Mexico:	Miss E. AGUIRRE
	Mr. H. CARDENAS RODRIGUEZ
Nigeria:	Alhaji SULE KOLO
	Mr. L.A. MALIKI

Poland:	Mr. H. JAROSZEK
	Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI
	Mr. H. STEPOSZ
	Mr. S. DAEROWA
Romania:	Mr. N. ECOBESCO
	Mr. V. CONSTANTINESCO
	Mr. V. TARZIORU
	Mr. C. GEORGESCO
Sweden:	Mr. A. EDELSTAM
	Mr. R. BOMAN
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
	Mr. O.A. GRINEVSKY
	Mr. I.I. TCHEPROV
	Mr. N.S. KISHILOV
United Arab Republic:	Mr. H. KHALLAF
	Mr. O. SIRRY
	Mr. E.S. El REEDY
	Mr. Y. RIZK
United Kingdom:	Mr. I.F. PORTER
	Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY
United States of America:	Mr. A.S. FISHER
	Mr. C. GLEYSTEEN
	Mr. W. GIVAN
	Mr. R.L. McCORMACK
Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. D. PROTITCH
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (United Arab Republic): I declare open the 407th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

2. Mr. LAHODA (Czechoslovakia): In view of the fact that a number of delegations have dealt in their statements with the effectiveness of our work and have advanced ideas on methods for improving it, may I at the very beginning of my statement say a few words on that topic.

3. In the opinion of the delegation of Czechoslovakia, the best method is that which will enable us to reach the desired positive results speedily. The prerequisite for this is the readiness and good will to reach agreement on the questions under consideration. Also required is a matter-of-fact approach to our deliberations and an endeavour to reach mutually acceptable solutions of the issues that have been selected for consideration. We assume that all members of our Committee have this in mind. All that is necessary for us now is to concentrate our attention in that spirit on the solution of the principal tasks before us. We have all agreed that, apart from the demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, which we have on the agenda for our informal meeting tomorrow, those tasks primarily include measures closely related to the problems of nuclear armament, and for that reason I should like to comment briefly on the underground test ban.

4. Much has been said on this subject both in this Committee and elsewhere. The debates we have had so far have helped to clarify many aspects of the problem and have presumably also contributed in substantial measure to the Swedish delegation's being in a position to submit on 1 April 1969 a complex, thoroughly considered, thought-provoking working paper (ENDC/242) with suggestions as to possible provisions of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests. The Czechoslovak delegation welcomes that initiative as yet another proof of the constructive approach of the Swedish delegation not only to the negotiations on banning nuclear tests but also to the work of our Committee as a whole.

5. We also take into account that, following the prolonged discussions of the topic, it is now quite appropriate for us to start negotiating on the language of a treaty ensuring the fulfilment of this urgent demand to the fullest extent. We expect that discussions within that concrete framework should make it considerably easier to reach agreement on this pressing problem. The Swedish working paper is an important

(Mr. Lahoda, Czechoslovakia)

document deserving detailed examination from a number of viewpoints. It will undoubtedly be the subject of an extensive and fruitful exchange of views in our Committee. I should like to make some preliminary comments on certain questions dealt with in that document.

6. The paper is apparently based on the premise that agreement on the banning of underground nuclear weapon tests calls in the first place for a political decision to be taken by those States upon which agreement on that question primarily depends. This view fully conforms to the one that Czechoslovakia has held for a number of years. We particularly appreciate the fact that the Swedish paper calls for the complete prohibition of underground nuclear tests. It allows no exemptions, regardless of the grounds which might be used in an attempt to justify them. The paper deals in a relatively detailed manner with the provisions relating to control. As suggested, the control would offer adequate guarantees to all parties to the treaty that obligations ensuing from it would be fully observed by all States parties. At the same time the control provisions would not impose upon individual States commitments exceeding those necessitated by the need for adequate control.

7. It is also our view that the undertaking providing for the total banning of underground nuclear weapon tests, as well as the obligations and further measures relating to control, should be assumed by the States parties to the treaty themselves. International co-operation in the exchange of seismological data should make it considerably easier for the States parties to the treaty to evaluate individual seismic events. As is well known, Swedish scientists have been paying considerable attention to those questions for quite some time. They have indeed accomplished a great deal in that respect. We have always appreciated the readiness with which the Swedish delegation has acquainted us with their findings in the past years. We feel that the latest Swedish working paper is based on the solid grounds of ample factual material provided by contemporary scientific research. That particular section of the working paper requires rather thorough examination and the Czechoslovak delegation is still analysing it. However, our study would be greatly facilitated if the Swedish delegation could elaborate in some detail on certain ideas in its draft. We have in mind particularly a more detailed explanation of the interrelationship between the provisions of paragraphs 3 (b) and 3 (c) of article II and their relationship to paragraph 4 of that article.

(Mr. Lahoda, Czechoslovakia)

8. We regard the statement of the Soviet delegation concerning the willingness of the Soviet Union to participate in the proposed exchange of seismological data (ENDC/PV.402, para.72) as a positive step. We welcome the fact that the United Kingdom has adopted a similar stand in that respect (ENDC/PV.404, para. 13 et seq.). If international co-operation is to accomplish its purpose, the participation of the United States is of great importance. We should appreciate hearing the views of the United States delegation on that subject. As for Czechoslovakia, we also are ready to join in the proposed exchange of data. We trust that our participation would be a component which would appropriately fit into the over-all picture.

9. We also listened with great interest to the statement made by the representative of Canada, Ambassador Ignatieff, at our meeting on 17 April (ibid., paras. 75 et seq.). It contained a number of stimulating ideas concerning international co-operation in the exchange of seismological data. That aspect also should be thoroughly examined. It concerns the concept of various technical problems studied by experts in a number of countries for several years. Their accomplishments so far appear to justify the assumption that the solution of the concrete technical problems does not represent an insurmountable obstacle.

10. As for the possible measures to be taken by our Committee in that respect, we feel that the right time to consider them will be after reasonable progress has been achieved on the crux of the problem, namely, the political principles underlying the whole matter.

11. Before I conclude my intervention I should like, with the indulgence of the Committee, to comment briefly on one particular topic which has been the subject of reflection and comment for quite some time. As is well known, various unofficial suggestions have been made recently relating to the enlargement of the Eighteen-Nation Committee to enable a wider range of States to participate in the disarmament negotiations. It is argued that disarmament problems do not concern any closed circle of States but affect the vital interests of all States. The existence of the Eighteen-Nation Committee with its present composition does not, we believe, in any way deny the interest of all States of the international community in the solution of disarmament problems.

12. The setting up of the Committee gave expression to the fact that the optimum conditions for negotiations on any subject matter exist in a body which thanks to its political composition and the number of its members offers the best prospects for fruitful

(Mr. Lahoda, Czechoslovakia)

work. Those views were taken into account at the time the Committee was formed in 1961. This is true as regards both the size of the Committee and the careful political balance of its composition. An adequate representation of the individual regions of the world was also taken into consideration. The functioning of the Committee over a period of nine years may be regarded as evidence of the fact that those criteria were correct and that it is appropriate that they should also be observed at the present time.

13. All those aspects should, in our opinion, be taken into account when further prospects for disarmament negotiations, and within their framework, also the work of this Committee, are considered. We are ready to approach all ideas relating to that question with an open mind. As a matter of principle, however, we start from the premise that any decision to that end should consistently respect in particular the principle of equitable political balance that was applied at the time the Committee was formed.

14. Mr. IGNATIEFF (Canada): In my opening statement at the second meeting of our resumed session I argued that the key to progress towards ending the nuclear arms race, which is our priority objective, would be the bilateral talks on the limitation of strategic arms between the United States and the Soviet Union and that the most important related measures would be the comprehensive test ban and the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes (ENDC/PV.396, paras.53-60). I said that we attached high priority to the discussion of the comprehensive test ban and the cut-off and hoped that conditions would so develop that consideration could usefully be given to the terms in which agreements on those two matters might be drawn.

15. As I have listened to the statements of other members of the Committee, I have been struck by the number who have taken a broadly similar view of the priorities. Some maintained, as I did, that progress in the strategic arms talks, the comprehensive test ban and the cut-off are required to reinforce the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*) and ensure that it becomes and remains effective. Others valued those measures for their own sake as means for ending qualitatively and quantitatively the nuclear arms race. In any case, there seems to be a consensus in favour of pressing ahead to the extent possible on those two fronts. This is not surprising if we recall the existence of such documents as the joint memorandum on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/178) of August 1966

(Mr. Ignatieff, Canada)

which was submitted by eight non-aligned members and referred specifically to those two measures. At our meeting on 17 April (ENDC/PV.404, para.75 et seq.) I made some suggestions in connexion with a statement made previously by our Swedish colleague (ENDC/PV.399, paras. 7 et seq.) for forward movement towards a comprehensive test ban and have been gratified by the reactions of my colleagues. Today I should like to make some remarks about the cut-off, in part because it is a question which was relegated to the background during the negotiation of the non-proliferation Treaty and it is some time since the Canadian delegation has discussed it.

16. Indeed, the record shows that the last time the Canadian delegation addressed itself to the cut-off was about two years and 100 meetings ago. On 20 June 1967, General Burns argued (ENDC/PV.306, para.7) that the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and the reconversion or transfer to peaceful purposes of present stockpiles would demonstrate that the nuclear Powers as well as the non-nuclear signatories of the non-proliferation Treaty were prepared to carry on the movement in the direction of the control of nuclear weapons and their eventual reduction and elimination. This surely remains an even more important consideration today than it was while the non-proliferation Treaty was still being negotiated. For it is hard to imagine anything more likely to speed up ratifications of the non-proliferation Treaty and its entry into force than evidence from this Committee that real progress is being made towards a comprehensive test ban and cut-off.

17. As we understood the rather negative attitude towards the cut-off on the part of the Soviet delegation in the past, it was based on the contention that such a measure would amount to "control without disarmament", and on the objection that the proposals regarding this measure would require revealing the location of plants producing fissionable materials, and opening them for inspection. It also was argued that the cut-off would not result in a significant reduction in nuclear arsenals. The Canadian delegation has drawn some encouragement from the absence from the statement of the Soviet representative at our meeting on 10 April (ENDC/PV.402, paras. 41 et seq.) of criticisms of the new United States proposal (ENDC/PV.401, paras. 7 and 8) that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system be employed to verify compliance with a cut-off. However, that encouragement was somewhat offset by our concern at the repetition of some of the other old arguments against this important measure.

(Mr. Ignatieff, Canada)

18. First of all, I should like to make clear the importance the Canadian delegation attaches to the change in the United States position with regard to verification of compliance with a cut-off which was announced by the United States representative at our 401st meeting on 8 April. Not that we regarded the previous United States attitude as unreasonable: on the contrary, the inspection system outlined in the working papers presented by the United States delegation to this Committee in 1964 and 1966 (ENDC/134, 172, 174 and 176 and Corr.1) impressed us as being neither burdensome nor unduly intrusive. Rather, it is because we share the view expressed by the United States representative (ENDC/PV.401, para. 15) that when the non-proliferation Treaty comes into effect the nuclear-weapon Powers should be prepared to accept, in the context of a cut-off agreement, the same safeguards on their fissionable materials production and their production facilities as are appropriate to verify non-proliferation on the part of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

19. In this connexion I would recall that the fact that the non-proliferation Treaty discriminates between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, with respect to the imposition of safeguards, has been the basis for considerable criticism of the Treaty. Moreover, that criticism has only in part been met by the voluntary acceptance on the part of the United Kingdom and the United States of IAEA safeguards on their non-military nuclear installations. A further arms control measure involving acceptance by the nuclear-weapon States, in respect of all their nuclear activities, of all safeguards they have called on other States to accept would remove this much-exploited argument against the non-proliferation Treaty. The voluntary acceptance of IAEA safeguards on their non-military nuclear installations by the nuclear Powers would indeed be one of the most valuable contributions towards establishing confidence between nuclear and non-nuclear Powers and sanity in the atomic age.

20. It has been argued against the cut-off that its adoption would not lead to the reduction of existing arsenals and would not restrict the further production of nuclear weapons. I would recall that this is precisely one of the arguments which opponents of the non-proliferation Treaty use to justify their refusal to sign that Treaty. It is an argument that can be used against the outer space Treaty (General

(Mr. Ignatieff, Canada)

Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI) annex), the Antarctic Treaty[1/] and the partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1). Moreover, similar allegations can be made against the draft treaty on the sea-bed (ENDC/240) which was submitted by the Soviet representative at our 395th meeting on 18 March. It would also apply to a comprehensive test ban. These are all preventive measures necessary to arrest the arms race before the process of reduction and elimination can gather momentum. Nor in the end is the argument completely accurate as far as the cut-off is concerned. The United States has made the offer (A/PV.1334, paras. 74-75) to couple an agreement on the cut-off with an agreement to transfer to peaceful uses an agreed amount of fissionable material -- that is 60,000 kilograms for the United States and 40,000 kilograms for the Soviet Union. The representative of the United States made the point most clearly when he said at our meeting of 11 August 1966:

> "We have also indicated our willingness to have ... 100,000 kilogrammes of U-235 taken from existing nuclear weapons. There would thus be destroyed thousands of nuclear weapons." (ENDC/PV.281, p.16)

21. The same can be said with respect to the objection that the cut-off "would not solve the problem of eliminating or reducing the threat of a nuclear war" (ENDC/PV.402, para. 77). None of the treaties I have just mentioned nor either of the drafts now before us was intended to solve that problem. They are designed for other purposes which are, however, related to the problem of eliminating or reducing the threat of nuclear war and providing in all cases, unlike some other proposed measures, the means of verification to ensure that their provisions are respected.

22. The Canadian Government, like the Governments of all members of this Committee, would be only too pleased if it were possible today to solve the problem of eliminating or reducing the threat of nuclear war. However, the possibilities of achieving at least the aim of eliminating the threat of nuclear war, except in the framework of general and complete disarmament, do not seem very great. We hope that measures which will reduce the threat will soon become possible.

1/ United Nations Treaty Series, vol.402, pp. 71 et seq.

(Mr. Ignatieff, Canada)

23. Meanwhile measures have been adopted, and proposals for others are before us, which aim at preventing the growth of the threat of nuclear war. In our view the cut-off forms an essential part of this pattern of prevention. Moreover, as a practical matter, the rearrangements in national nuclear programmes for ending the programmes for the supply of nuclear materials for weapons production would be likely to involve considerable time. If the principle of the cut-off could be accepted, even though final action cannot at present be taken, some interim steps might be initiated towards phasing out some aspects of military production. Those with longer service than I around this table will recognize that I am reverting to the constructive ideas put forward by the representative of Sweden at the meeting of the Committee on 11 August 1966, when she suggested proceeding in the first place by way of freezing production of nuclear weapon materials and developing to a gradual phasing out (ENDC/PV.281, pp.4-5). I have no doubt that if the Committee were to study closely the possibilities of making progress towards a cut-off we should be able to identify preparatory action which could usefully be taken at this stage. By doing this it would be possible to reflect in our report to the twenty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly the seriousness with which the Committee approached this along with other measures related to the cessation of the nuclear arms race.

24. Miss AGUIRRE (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): I merely wish to make a brief statement in order to inform this Committee, on the instructions of my Government, that in view of the fact that the Ministry of External Affairs of Mexico received on 25 April 1969 a declaration by the Government of Barbados which will be annexed to its instrument of ratification of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (ENDC/186), and whereby the said Government waives all the requirements laid down in article 28, paragraph 1 of the Treaty itself, the number of signatory States for which the Treaty is now fully in force has risen to eleven.

25. For this reason, and in application of paragraph 3 of that same article 28, my Government has already asked the ten other countries which, besides Mexico, are parties to the Treaty — namely, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Honduras, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay and Barbados -- whether they agree that the preliminary meeting provided for in the Treaty in order that the agency for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America may be set up and commence its work

(Miss Aguirre, Mexico)

should begin on Tuesday, 24 June 1969, in Mexico City, which will be the headquarters of the agency, as stipulated in the Treaty.

26. The CHAIRMAN (United Arab Republic): I am sure that I reflect the views of all the members of this Conference in congratulating Latin America, and in particular Mexico, on the coming into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (ENDC/186). This is a momentous step towards realizing the aims which all of us here seek to achieve.

27. Mr. FISHER (United States of America): We are all happy to hear, from the statement of the representative of Mexico, that on 25 April the world took another step towards the control of nuclear weapons. We are happy to note that on that date Barbados became the twelfth country to deposit its instrument of ratification of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (ENDC/186) and the eleventh to do so with a waiver of all other requirements for entry into force. It now becomes possible for those eleven States to meet together for the purpose of establishing the agency that will administer this Treaty. The United States is gratified to hear that a definite date has been set for that meeting.

28. The United States took great satisfaction in April 1968 in signing Additional Protocol II to this Treaty, thereby signifying its intention to respect the denuclearization of Latin America. I note that the United Kingdom also has signed that Protocol and I hope that other nuclear Powers may be able to sign the Protocol in the future.

29. The United States has followed closely the progress of our Latin American friends and neighbours along the road towards the permanent prohibition of nuclear weapons from their respective territories. We now applaud this most recent development and shall watch with keen interest as the Treaty's international agency takes form. That agency will be dealing with matters, such as verification, which lie at the heart of nuclear arms control. Accordingly its success in dealing with such matters will be instructive to us all.

30. The CHAIRMAN (United Arab Republic): Before proceeding to read the communiqué I wish to tell the Committee that the co-Chairmen understand that no delegation has asked to speak on 1 May 1969 and in view of that fact they recommend that the next formal meeting of the Committee be held on Tuesday, 6 May 1969.

It was so decided.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 407th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador H. Khallaf, representative of the United Arab Republic.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Canada and Mexico, by the Chairman and by the representative of the United States of America.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 6 May 1969, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.10 a.m.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.408
6 May 1969
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 6 May 1969, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. I.F. PORTER (United Kingdom)

GE.69-10035
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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:	Mr. S.A. FRAZAO
	Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
	Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA
	Mr. J. NOGUEIRA FILHO
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. CHRISTOV
	Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
	Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV
Burma:	U CHIT MYAING
	U KYAW MIN
Canada:	Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
	Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL
	Mr. J.R. MORDEN
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. T. LAHODA
	Mr. V. VAJNAR
	Mr. V. SAFAR
	Mr. J. STRUCKA
Ethiopia:	Mr. A. ZELLEKE
India:	Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
	Mr. N. KRISHNAN
	Mr. K.P. JAIN
Italy:	Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI
	Mr. R. BORSARELLI
	Mr. U. PESTALOZZA
Mexico:	Mr. J. CASTANEDA
	Miss E. AGUIRRE
	Mr. H. CARDENAS RODRIGUEZ
	Mr. R. VALERO
Nigeria:	Alhaji SULE KOLO
	Mr. L.A. MALIKI

Poland:	Mr. H. JAROSZEK
	Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI
	Mr. H. STEPOSZ
	Mr. S. DABROWA
Romania:	Mr. N. ECOBESCO
	Mr. V. CONSTANTINESCO
	Mr. V. TARZIORU
	Mr. C. GEORGESCO
Sweden:	Mr. A. EDELSTAM
	Mr. I. VIRGIN
	Mr. R. BOMAN
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
	Mr. O.A. GRINEVSKY
	Mr. I.I. TCHEPROV
	Mr. N.S. KISHILOV
United Arab Republic:	Mr. H. KHALLAF
	Mr. O. SIRRY
	Mr. E.S. El REEDY
	Mr. Y. RIZK
United Kingdom:	Mr. I.F. PORTER
	Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY
United States of America:	Mr. A.S. FISHER
	Mr. C. GLEYSTEEN
	Mr. W. GIVAN
	Mr. T.S. WILKINSON
Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. D. PROTITCH
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I declare open the 408th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

2. Members of the Committee will all be aware of the sad news of the sudden death on 3 May of the President of India, Dr. Zakir Husain, and equally aware, no doubt of President Zakir Husain's distinguished services to India and of the outstanding example he gave to the world in that regard. I am sure that I speak for all members of the Committee in saying that the Committee would wish to honour the memory of this distinguished statesman by observing one minute's silence and by requesting our colleague, Ambassador Husain, to convey to the Government of India and to the family of the deceased our deepest condolences and sympathy on the great loss to India and to the members of his family. May I therefore ask the members of the Committee to rise and observe one minute's silence.

The representatives, standing, observed one minute's silence.

3. Mr. HUSAIN (India): On behalf of my delegation I wish to express our deep appreciation for the sentiments of sympathy and condolence which all my colleagues here have extended to us on the passing away of our President, Dr. Zakir Husain. It is indeed a great and tragic loss for our country. I shall certainly convey the sentiments expressed here this morning to the Government of India and to the members of the family of the late President.

4. The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): Before I call upon the only speaker on my list this morning I should like to extend a warm welcome to Ambassador Castañeda, who is back with us.

5. U CHIT MYAING (Burma): In intervening at this stage of our deliberations, it would be quite superfluous for me to speak about the special importance of this year's session, the heavy tasks in hand, the need and urgency to make progress, the desirability of adopting appropriate working methods that would enable us to tackle our tasks with expedition and despatch, and so on. Representatives who have preceded me have ably and forcefully drawn the Committee's attention to those matters. I shall therefore proceed to offer my delegation's views on some of the items on our agenda (ENDC/236, p.3) to which we attach special significance.

6. I think it equally unnecessary to restate at any length the long-held view of my delegation that the problem of nuclear weapons and their carriers forms the heart of the whole armaments question, and that no appreciable progress towards our ultimate goal of

(U Chit Myaing, Burma)

general and complete disarmament will be possible unless we succeed in effectively controlling the nuclear arms race and putting it into reverse. With disarmament prospects seemingly in the balance at this particular juncture, this task has become doubly urgent. It is in the same context that the projected strategic arms talks between the Soviet Union and the United States have assumed an added significance. If, therefore, I devote the greater part of my statement today to problems in the nuclear field, it is because I sincerely believe that the prevailing circumstances require our Committee to concentrate more on this area than on what are sometimes called the marginal areas of disarmament.

7. Among the wide range of important measures in the field of nuclear disarmament requiring our Committee's urgent attention, the elaboration of an underground test ban treaty must, in our opinion, rank first in priority. My delegation has explained on previous occasions the reasons why we attach such overriding importance to that particular measure and I shall not tire the Committee by recapitulating them today. However, I feel I must stress one point. Since military underground nuclear testing has indeed come to denote the nuclear arms race itself, with the word "testing" signifying developing, improving, perfecting, refining, diversifying and, of course, quantitatively increasing nuclear weapon systems, I think it can fairly be said that a permanent stopping of such testing is required not only as a necessary first step towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race but also to underpin such agreements as may, we hope, emerge from the projected talks between the Soviet Union and the United States on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms. Consequently, achieving a comprehensive test ban -- which, I might mention in passing, has gone through far more exhaustive and searching negotiations that any other single measure related to nuclear disarmament -- has assumed greater significance an urgency than ever before.

8. My delegation is therefore much heartened to observe that the trend of discussion on this key question at our current session is becoming more concrete and purposeful. For this welcome development we are largely indebted to the Swedish delegation, and more particularly for its decisive and timely initiative in presenting to the Committee on 1 April 1969 a working paper (ENDC/242) with suggestions as to possible provisions of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests. We consider that working paper to be a serious and constructive document containing well-pondered, practical ideas, and a document that has within it the seeds of an agreement on a comprehensive test ban. My delegation strongly hopes that, taking the Swedish draft as a basis, the

(U Chit Hyaing, Burma)

deliberations in our Committee will before too long develop into full-fledged, forthright negotiations reminiscent of those which took place here in this Committee during the 1962-1963 period and which brought us very near indeed to achieving a comprehensive test ban treaty.

9. The statements of the United States and Soviet delegations made on 8 and 10 April respectively (ENDC/PV.401, paras 2-31 and ENDC/PV.402, paras 41-83) have again made it all too clear that verification remains the main area of disagreement between these two countries and that both are standing fast on their previously stated positions. The effect of this, to my mind, is to throw open the field once again for the further exploration and consideration of different possibilities and different approaches, including those already suggested, towards promoting a meeting of minds on this intractable problem.

10. I should like at this point to reaffirm my delegation's support for an organized international exchange of seismological data, a concept which owes its origin to a Swedish initiative and is now embodied in article II, paragraph 2 of the Swedish working paper. Whatever differing views may still exist regarding the adequacy or sufficiency of seismic detection and identification as the sole means of monitoring an underground test ban treaty, there can hardly be any disagreement that effective international co-operation in the exchange of seismological data will do much to ease the difficulty we are facing. It is therefore gratifying to note that the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.402, para. 72) and the United Kingdom (ENDC/PV.404, para 13 et seq.) have indicated their readiness to take part in such an undertaking. We very much look forward to hearing the views of the United States delegation with regard to article II, paragraph 2 of the Swedish draft and hope that these will soon be forthcoming.

11. In this connexion I should like to express my delegation's appreciation of the valuable contributions which a number of delegations, notably those of Sweden, Canada and the United Kingdom, are continuing to make in this regard on the basis of the highly advanced seismological work being carried out in their own countries. This has helped us to understand better the various aspects of an effective international data exchange and given us a clearer idea as to how this might be organized. I trust that our Committee will continue to benefit from similar contributions from those and other delegations which are in a position to make them.

(U Chit Myaing, Burma)

12. As I stated earlier, the unchanged positions of the two principal nuclear Powers on the verification issue call for the exploration of different possibilities and different approaches in the hope of promoting or facilitating agreement. It is solely and strictly in that spirit that I shall now venture to offer a few preliminary thoughts on this problem.

13. As my delegation sees it -- and we stand to be corrected on this score -- the present disagreement derives not from any irreconcilable differences over fundamental or general principles but rather from an honest difference of opinion as to the practical requirements of an adequate or sufficient comprehensive test ban verification. Perhaps to say this is to over-simplify matters, but, if I am not too far off the mark, then the task of finding ways of overcoming the difficulty will certainly become less arduous. We can then consider the problem on a practical level, free from the complications which consideration in a wider context would surely entail.

14. As often mentioned, the conclusion of an underground test ban treaty, as well as the form and content of its verification provision, will depend ultimately on the political decisions of the Soviet Union and the United States. To my mind, those decisions will have to be reached in the nature of political gestures of good will and concessions to peace. It is precisely because of that that we should do everything that is likely to facilitate the reaching of such decisions and at the same time eschew everything that could possibly contribute to a further hardening of attitudes, which is not conducive to reaching these decisions.

15. To that end, I wonder whether it would not be advisable in the first place to clear the air politically by starting off from the political premise that States adhering to a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests will in fact refrain from conducting such tests. It is here worth recalling that the three-year nuclear test moratorium, to September 1961, was indeed observed by all concerned. Such an approach would impart to verification -- whose need in one form or another nobody seems to question -- the unmistakably positive purpose and function of confirming confidence and, at the same time, would divest it of any semblances of the negative purpose and function of disproving suspicion. That might well serve the double purpose of making the political decisions I have mentioned easier to arrive at, and of opening up wider, more meaningful possibilities for efforts to bridge the verification requirement gap.

(U Chit Myaing, Burma)

16. Looking at the problem from another pragmatic angle, I have sometimes wondered whether some kind of inbuilt flexibility in relation to the verification arrangements would not be more conducive to the early conclusion of an underground test ban treaty, without however affecting its stability. The main object of such flexibility would be to provide a form of gestation period, and not to make control weak or ineffective. But it would also meet a certain practical need, namely, that of up-dating the verification arrangements, whenever deemed required, in the light of experience; further improvements in seismic and, perhaps, other long-range detection and identification capabilities; changes in the political climate, and so on. That it may not be possible or desirable to devise a verification system for all time becomes apparent when one compares the elaborate control plans for a comprehensive test ban treaty that were considered during the 1958-1961 talks with their more streamlined derivatives that were examined during the 1962-1963 negotiations. Thus, while the verification arrangements agreed upon and embodied in the treaty may be appropriate at the time of its conclusion, they may no longer be so in, say, the fifth year of the treaty. On the other hand, the treaty itself is to be of unlimited duration, and necessarily so.

17. Of course, changes considered necessary could be introduced under the amendments clause, but its involved procedure, appropriate in relation to other treaty provisions may not be thought appropriate in relation to the verification provision. The desirability and advisability might therefore be examined of inserting in the treaty a provision, independent of the amendments procedure, specifically for the purpose of enabling parties, after a specified period of time, to review the treaty's verification provisions in the light of experience and other pertinent considerations and to effect such modifications to those provisions as they may decide upon. Theoretically, this would mean that the treaty's control formula, whatever its nature and content, would be open at both ends -- at least during the initial period -- but if present trends are any indication, its evolution in practice cannot but be in the direction of a more scientific, simplified and streamlined system.

18. Any serious contemplation of the comprehensive test ban verification question inevitably brings to mind the requirements of a future international regime for peaceful nuclear explosions. As we know, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

(U Chit Myaing, Burma)

Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/226*) envisages appropriate international observation and appropriate international procedures in connexion with the provision of the benefits of such explosions. Of course, under that Treaty these arrangements will not apply to peaceful nuclear explosions carried out in the territories of the nuclear-weapon States. That is only to be expected because, among other factors, the comprehensive test ban effect of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons does not apply to the nuclear-weapon Powers. But when, with the conclusion of an underground test ban treaty, those Powers too come under a universal comprehensive test ban regime, the need will arise for arrangements which are drawn up along similar lines but which are appropriate to the subject matter of the treaty. These arrangements, to be laid down in a separate international agreement regulating the conduct of peaceful nuclear explosions, will be different from those envisaged in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to the extent that the subject matters of the two treaties will be different.

19. Thus, while the international arrangements envisaged in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will have to be so formulated as to reinforce the non-proliferation regime, those accompanying an underground test ban treaty will have to be so formulated as to reinforce the comprehensive test ban regime. And, since peaceful nuclear explosive devices are indistinguishable from nuclear weapons and the development work on both is identical, some military spin-off will presumably result from peaceful nuclear explosions, particularly from those carried out by way of testing new and better models of peaceful nuclear explosive devices. Therefore, it seems that this problem too will have to be taken care of in the separate international agreement regulating the conduct of peaceful nuclear explosions. Giving inclusive and forward thought as to how this might best be done might enable us to see the entire picture more clearly, and my delegation would therefore welcome views in that connexion, particularly from the nuclear-weapon Powers.

20. I am very sorry to have dwelt so long on this subject. I have done so only because of the great importance and urgency which my delegation attaches to the achievement of a comprehensive test ban. Before leaving the subject, I must once again make it very clear that the tentative thoughts I have offered, for what they are worth, are not and do not pretend to be proposals.

(U Thit Myaing, Burma)

21. Permit me now to turn to another important measure in the nuclear field. It has all along been my delegation's policy to support all proposals which in our judgement could result in effective measures leading progressively to nuclear disarmament. Consistent with this policy, we have urged in the past that high-priority consideration be given to the cut-off and transfer proposals in conjunction with the proposal for the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear stockpiles, since we believe that all those measures form a logical sequence of decisive steps towards nuclear disarmament. Now that bilateral talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms appear to be in sight, we feel even more strongly that our Committee should begin serious discussions of these proposals without further loss of time.

22. In this connexion we have studied with care the statement made by the representative of the United States on 8 April in which he made an important new proposal for International Atomic Energy Agency verification of a cut-off agreement (ENDC/PV.401, paras. 7 and 8). We have also noted that the United Kingdom has taken a similar position (ENDC/PV.404, para. 18). In stating, on 10 October 1967, our views on the basic requirements of a non-proliferation treaty, my delegation observed that since that treaty was avowedly a lead towards steps in the process of nuclear disarmament, one of its essential elements should be the application of international controls on all nuclear activities of all countries (ENDC/PV.337, para. 22). We therefore welcome the revised proposal as a step in the right direction.

23. I should like to conclude my statement with a few brief comments on the question of preventing an arms race on the sea-bed. Although in nature a preventive measure, as its title suggests, an agreement on this question would, we believe, significantly contain the armaments problem by excluding a vast area of the earth from the arms race. It could even have an arms-control effect if it resulted in the abandonment of research and development work on new mass destruction weapons systems custom-made for sea-bed installation and launching. Therefore, though belonging more to the future than to the present, its significance for international peace and security could be both profound and far-reaching.

24. It is against that background that my delegation welcomes the high priority given to this item in the messages of Chairman Kosygin (ENDC/238) and President Nixon (ENDC/239*), and particularly the presentation by the Soviet delegation on the opening day of the current session of a complete draft treaty text on the total demilitarization of the sea-bed (ENDC/240).

(U Chit Myaing, Burma)

25. As several previous speakers have pointed out, the three main questions requiring decision concern the scope of the prohibition, the extent of the area to be covered by the prohibition and the nature of the verification system. Many delegations have expressed interesting views on those questions and we are studying them carefully. Tentatively, my delegation feels that the provisions of the projected treaty regarding each of these issues should be such as would ensure, firstly, the effective prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed; secondly, the exclusively peaceful utilization of the largest possible area of the sea-bed in accordance with the accepted principles of international law regarding such utilization; and, finally, the security of all coastal States equally, whether nuclear or non-nuclear, large or small.

26. My Government is carefully studying the Soviet draft in conjunction with the lucid and persuasive explanations of its main provisions given by the representative of the Soviet Union at our meeting on 3 April (ENDC/PV.400, paras. 2-36), and also in the light of the many interesting comments made by several other delegations. I hope to be able to offer at a later meeting detailed comments on this subject as well as some observations on the other important subjects which I have not been able to touch upon in this statement.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 408th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador I.F. Porter, representative of the United Kingdom.

"The Conference observed one minute's silence in honour of the memory of the late President of India, Dr. Zakir Husain.

"A statement was made by the representative of Burma.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 8 May 1969, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.5 a.m.